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The ideological outlook of federal judges has long been a focal point 
for criticism of the judiciary, but it has taken on new urgency with the 
escalating political rhetoric and polarization in Washington. President 
Trump’s recent reference to a district court judge as an “Obama 
Judge,” after the judge ruled against the Administration in an 
immigration case, exemplifies the increasingly partisan view of federal 
judges. In an unusually high-profile response, Chief Justice Roberts 
defended the judiciary by asserting categorically that “[w]e do not have 
Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton 
judges . . . . What we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated 
judges doing their level best to do equal right to those appearing before 
them.” 
 
Justice Roberts’s statement may appear defensive or naive, particularly 
in an era of hyper-politicized judicial confirmations. However, setting 
aside the Supreme Court, the evidence that exists on the influence of 
judicial ideology is mixed at best, as most empirical studies find that a 
judge’s politics have only a modest impact on case outcomes. Existing 
studies also overlook how changes in executive branch policies affect 
judicial review and thus confound the influence of judicial ideology with 
presidential politics. In this study, we find that the influence of judicial 
ideology on case outcomes is mediated by the partisanship of the 
executive branch. Thus, while public debates about the federal judiciary 
focus on whether judges are political, the underlying driver is often 
politically driven conflicts between executive branch policies and 
governing statutes. 
 
Overall, judicial ideology affected case outcomes in less than five 
percent of the appellate cases we analyzed over roughly a fifteen-year 
period spanning the George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
Administrations. The influence of ideology on case outcomes was lowest 
during the Obama Administration, when presidential politics aligned 
strongly with the environmental laws we studied. Moreover, when it was 
a factor during the Bush Administration, judicial ideology had a 
moderating effect on executive branch policies through judicial 
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opinions that guided policies towards centrist positions more in line 
with statutory mandates, which may or may not align with the current 
political views of the executive branch or Congress. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ideological outlook of federal judges has long been a focal point for 
criticism of the judiciary, but it has taken on new urgency with the escalating 
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political rhetoric and polarization in Washington.1 President Trump’s recent 
reference to district court Judge Jon Tigar as an “Obama Judge,” after he ruled 
against the Administration in an immigration asylum case, exemplifies the 
increasingly partisan view of federal judges.2 In an unusually high-profile 
response, Chief Justice Roberts defended the judiciary by asserting categorically 
that:  
We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton 
judges . . . . What we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing 
their level best to do equal right to those appearing before them. That 
independent judiciary is something we should all be thankful for.3 
Justice Roberts’s statement may appear defensive or naive, particularly in 
an era of hyper-politicized judicial confirmations.4 However, setting aside the 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See, e.g., Daniel Bush, Trump’s Conservative Picks Will Impact Courts for Decades, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trumps-
conservative-picks-will-impact-courts-for-decades [https://perma.cc/UR7K-99NV]; 
Kevin Schaul & Kevin Uhrmacher, How Trump Is Shifting the Most Important Courts in the 
Country, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ 
2018/politics/trump-federal-judges/ [https://perma.cc/V9AD-DXUJ]; Jason Zengerle, 
How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 22,  
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary 
.html [https://perma.cc/L4QG-VJM8]. 
 2 Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks 
‘Obama Judge,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/ 
politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html [https://perma.cc/E3L7-83ZY]; see 
also Jess Bravin, No Obama or Trump Judges Here, Appointees of Both Declare, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-say-they-arent-extensions-of-
presidents-who-appointed-them-11568566598 [https://perma.cc/RUJ6-JCLX]. 
 3 Liptak, supra note 2. President Trump followed up with “[s]orry Chief Justice John 
Roberts, but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges,’ . . . and they have a much different point 
of view than the people who are charged with the safety of our country.” Id. 
 4 Joan Biskupic, The ‘Partisan’ Players Transforming the Supreme Court, WASH. 
POST (June 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-partisan-players-
transforming-the-supreme-court/2019/06/21/9cc6596a-8964-11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8f 
b_story.html [https://perma.cc/L5AN-VHAY]; Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting 
Indelible Conservative Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/trump-judges.html [https://perma.cc/8DE2 
-M5VC]; Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Are Trump’s Judicial Nominees Really 
Being Confirmed at a Record Pace? The Answer Is Complicated, WASH. POST (June 14, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/14/are-trumps 
-judicial-nominees-really-being-confirmed-at-a-record-pace-the-answer-is-complicated 
[https://perma.cc/UY6U-7HV7]; Sean Sullivan & Mike DeBonis, With Little Fanfare, 
Trump and McConnell Reshape the Nation’s Circuit Courts, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/with-little-fanfare-trump-and-mcconnell-res 
hape-the-nations-circuit-courts/2018/08/14/10610028-9fcd-11e8-93e3-24d1703d2a7a 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/PF3T-P9H4]; Evan Thomas, How Supreme Court 
Nominations Became So Partisan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2019/06/23/books/review/carl-hulse-confirmation-bias.html [https://perma.cc/ 
178 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2 
Supreme Court, the evidence that exists on the influence of judicial ideology is 
mixed at best, as most empirical studies find that a judge’s politics have only a 
modest impact on case outcomes.5 The disconnect between perceptions and 
empirics persists, in part, because most studies emphasize the disparities 
between Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges through the exclusive 
use of relative rates for case outcomes without considering the small absolute 
number of cases impacted.6 Further, existing studies overlook how changes in 
executive branch policies affect judicial review and thus confound the influence 
of judicial ideology with presidential politics.7 We find that the influence of 
judicial ideology on case outcomes is mediated by the partisanship of the 
executive branch.8 Thus, while public debates about the federal judiciary focus 
on whether judges are political,9 the underlying driver is often politically driven 
conflicts between executive branch policies and statutory mandates. 
This Article examines the influence of judicial ideology in administrative 
review cases and presents new empirical results that qualify its significance in 
district and appellate courts. Focusing on litigation under two prominent 
environmental laws, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), we observe statistically significant differences 
in plaintiffs’ success rates across circuits and presidential administrations. Our 
data span the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations, which 
provide contrasting ideological outlooks for assessing the impact of presidential 
politics on judicial review. Overall, we find that the influence of judicial 
ideology affects case outcomes in less than five percent of the appellate cases.10 
                                                                                                                     
J2QM-484P] (reviewing CARL HULSE, CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE WASHINGTON’S WAR 
OVER THE SUPREME COURT, FROM SCALIA’S DEATH TO JUSTICE KAVANAUGH (2019)).  
 5 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 807 (2008) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Real World] 
(finding that “our data demonstrate that judicial ideology is not playing a dominant role and 
that judicial policy choices are not driving arbitrariness review”). 
 6 See, e.g., id. (explaining that “Republican appointees vote to validate most liberal 
agency decisions, and Democratic appointees vote to validate most conservative agency 
decisions”). 
 7 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: 
A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304 (2004) (proposing three hypotheses to 
explain ideological voting but not addressing the role of presidential ideology). 
 8 See infra Part IV. 
 9 See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Political Polarization Takes Hold of the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/us/politics/political -polar 
ization-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/MDY9-Z686]. 
 10 We define each judge’s political/ideological outlook by the party of the appointing 
president: judges appointed by Republican presidents were designated as Republican judges; 
judges appointed by Democratic presidents were designated as Democratic judges. The party 
of the appointing president is a rough proxy for judicial ideology, but it has the virtue that it 
errs on the side of obscuring the impact of ideology because the party of the appointing 
president does not necessarily reflect the ideology of the judge. Accordingly, if we observe 
a statistically significant effect, it is likely to be a lower bound on the actual influence of 
ideology.  
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In absolute terms, this translates to about 9 cases out of 180 under the ESA and 
11 cases out of 334 under NEPA over roughly a fifteen-year period. The 
influence of judicial ideology was lowest during the Obama Administration, 
when presidential politics aligned strongly with the two environmental 
statutes.11 Moreover, when it was a factor, judicial ideology had a moderating 
effect on executive branch policies through judicial opinions that guided 
policies towards centrist positions consistent with statutory mandates.12 These 
findings demonstrate the critical role that external political factors play in 
mediating the influence of judicial ideology and elucidate the conditions under 
which they can break down. 
A rich literature, focused largely on the Supreme Court and federal appellate 
courts, has evolved over the last two decades and examines the influence of 
ideology on judicial review.13 Researchers have found that judicial ideology is 
a statistically significant factor in the resolution of cases over a wide range of 
legal areas, and that the Supreme Court—as opposed to the Executive or 
Congress—has the greatest influence on judicial decision-making.14 They also 
find that the influence of judicial ideology is moderated on appellate panels with 
a mix of Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges, largely owing to the 
                                                                                                                     
 11 See, e.g., President Obama Brings Back ESA Consultation, WILDLIFE MGMT. INST. 
(Mar. 15, 2009), https://wildlifemanagement.institute/outdoor-news-bulletin/march-
2009/president-obama-brings-back-esa-consultation [https://perma.cc/W7ZS-MANR]; 
Steps to Modernize and Reinvigorate NEPA, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, https://obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/nepa  [https://perma.cc/75 
64-YGL2].  
 12 See infra Part IV.D. 
 13 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 28 (2017); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE 
L.J. 2155, 2155–56 (1998); Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: 
A Model of Consensus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781, 781 (2011) [hereinafter Fischman, 
Estimating Preferences]; Joshua B. Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: 
A Social Interactions Framework, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 808, 808 (2013) [hereinafter 
Fischman, Voting Patterns]; Morgan Hazelton et al., Panel Effects in Administrative Law: A 
Study of Rules, Standards, and Judicial Whistleblowing, 71 SMU L. REV. 445, 445 (2018); 
Stefanie A. Lindquist & Susan B. Haire, Decision Making by an Agent with Multiple 
Principals: Environmental Policy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES 
AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 230 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006); Thomas J. Miles & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of 
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2006) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Policy]; 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1717, 1717–19 (1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Ideology]; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald 
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 984, 988; Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center: Strategic 
Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 638, 638 
(2013); Sunstein et al., supra note 7, at 304. 
 14 See, e.g., Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1767–68 (explaining that the D.C. 
Circuit regards the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, “as the primary reviewer of their 
decisions”). 
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strong norm of unanimity that exists on appellate courts.15 The prominence of 
these “panel effects” has produced different models of judicial decision-making, 
ranging from deliberative theories, in which judges influence each other through 
persuasive argumentation, to whistleblower theories, in which a judge’s threat 
to dissent in a case provides leverage for compromise with her colleagues.16 The 
literature explores the practical and normative implications of these and other 
theories, but no single theory has prevailed that explains why ideologically 
mixed panels have such a powerful moderating effect on opinions.17 We extend 
this work by incorporating new factors into the analysis and by evaluating the 
results in context to assess their practical significance. 
This study differs from the existing literature by covering an extended time 
period, roughly fifteen years, and by including geographic information at the 
national, circuit, and state levels. We focus on litigation under NEPA and the 
ESA because they are frequently the subject of litigation and have long been the 
target of intense political battles.18 Both statutes are currently the target of major 
regulatory and legislative reform efforts,19 and concerns about litigation are a 
prominent theme.20 Litigation under NEPA and the ESA has the additional 
                                                                                                                     
 15 See Sunstein et al., supra note 7, at 337–38 (explaining the phenomenon of “collegial 
concurrences”). 
 16 See id. at 344–45 (describing the “whistleblower effect”). 
 17 See infra Part II. 
 18 See Jacob W. Malcom & Ya-Wei Li, Data Contradict Common Perceptions About a 
Controversial Provision of the US Endangered Species Act, 112 PNAS 15,844, 15,844 
(2015); Marion D. Miller, The National Environmental Policy Act and Judicial Review After 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council and Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 223, 236 (1991) (“NEPA thus remains a lightning rod for 
conflicting views concerning the degree to which environmental protection should be 
implemented through federal planning procedures.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Timothy Cama, Senate GOP Seeks Overhaul of Endangered Species Act, 
HILL (July 2, 2018), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/395135-senate-gop-
seeks-overhaul-of-endangered-species-act [https://perma.cc/UK6K-8JAY] (describing 
“an ambitious effort to overhaul the [ESA]”); Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, 
Lawmakers, Lobbyists and the Administration Join Forces to Overhaul the Endangered 
Species Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/climate 
/endangered-species-act-trump-administration.html [https://perma.cc/972N-D5DR]; 
DIANE KATZ, HERITAGE FOUND., TIME TO REPEAL THE OBSOLETE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA) (Mar. 2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/ 
default/files/2018-03/BG3293_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KM7-6YPK] (urging NEPA’s 
repeal); Laura Zuckerman, Scientists Voice Opposition to Weakening of U.S. Endangered 
Species Act, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wildlife-
endangered/scientists-voice-opposition-to-weakening-of-u-s-endangered-species-act-id 
USKCN1M42PG [https://perma.cc/5VDY-NS4H] (describing accusation that the Trump 
Administration is trying to erode the ESA in favor of commercial interests). 
 20 See, e.g., Examining ‘Sue and Settle’ Agreements: Part I: Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Interior, Energy, and Env’t and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Affairs 
of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. 55–63 (2017) (statement of 
Kent Holsinger, Manager, Holsinger Law, LLC), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/05/Holsinger_Testimony_Sue-and-Settle_05242017.pdf [https://perma 
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virtue that it is unevenly distributed across the country (nearly two-thirds of the 
cases were filed in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits), which strengthened our 
statistical analyses and inter-circuit comparisons.21 Finally, both statutes have 
powerful procedural mandates that federal judges interpret strictly.22 The legal 
posture of the cases consequently heightens the influence of judicial ideology 
because judges are less deferential to federal agencies when such procedural 
claims are raised than, for example, when administrative challenges implicate 
agency expertise or experience.23 
The distinctive attributes of the cases and the duration of our study expose 
the conditions under which judicial review is more likely to check executive 
power. In district courts, we find that plaintiffs were 1.8 times more likely to 
prevail before a Democratic than a Republican judge, and they were 2.5 times 
more likely to prevail in the Ninth Circuit than in other circuits.24 At the 
appellate level, environmental plaintiffs were two to four times more likely to 
prevail before an all-Democratic panel than before a majority-Republican panel, 
and they were about twice as likely to prevail during the Bush Administration 
as during the Obama Administration.25 However, the disparity in case outcomes 
between appellate panels dominated by judges with opposing political 
affiliations largely disappeared during the Obama Administration, falling from 
roughly thirty to five percentage points.26 Most of this convergence was 
attributable to a decline in the rate at which majority-Democratic panels ruled 
in favor of environmental plaintiffs, whereas little change was observed for 
Republican-majority panels.27 In other words, judicial ideology had a 
moderating effect overall on administrative policies during the Bush 
                                                                                                                     
.cc/BPR9-WC9E]; Press Release, House Comm. on Nat. Res., How Environmentalist 
Litigation Is Sending Our National Forests up in Smoke (June 8, 2017), http://www 
.freerangereport.com/how-environmentalist-litigation-is-sending-our-national-forests-up-
in-smoke/ [https://perma.cc/PCV6-84DK] (asserting that litigation under NEPA and the 
ESA is “significantly hindering active management” of the national forests); cf. Patrick 
Parenteau, Citizen Suits under the Endangered Species Act: Survival of the Fittest, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 321, 351 (2004) (characterizing the ESA’s citizen suit as “a potent weapon 
for conservationists,” but noting the “ferocious political backlash” and legislative reform 
efforts that such litigation has prompted). 
 21 See infra Figures 1–2. 
 22 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012); see also Thomas v. 
Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he strict substantive provisions of the ESA 
justify more stringent enforcement of its procedural requirements, because the procedural 
requirements are designed to ensure compliance with the substantive provisions.”); Daly v. 
Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 257−58 (W.D. Wash. 1972) (“The provisions of NEPA are not 
highly flexible, but establish a strict standard of procedure.”). 
 23 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1031, 
1044–45 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (justifying less deferential review of NEPA procedural mandates 
than of challenges to substantive matters based on relative expertise of courts and agencies). 
 24 See infra notes 16366 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 16870 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 17071 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra Part III.B.1. 
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Administration, with Democratic judges guiding executive branch policies 
towards a centrist position when they considered them to be inconsistent with 
statutory mandates. 
We believe that the variation observed in the influence of judicial ideology 
is structural and that it is active during liberal and conservative administrations. 
The principal factor is the political alignments and misalignments between 
judges, the statute under review, and the presidential administration in power. If 
a statute associated with liberal values, such as NEPA or the ESA, is under 
review, the influence of judicial ideology will depend on the political orientation 
of the presidential administration. During a Republican administration, 
Republican judges will be sympathetic to the administration and unsympathetic 
to the liberal goals of the statute (both factors aligning against plaintiffs seeking 
to enforce statutory requirements), whereas Democratic judges will be 
sympathetic to the goals of the statute but unsympathetic to the administration 
(both factors aligning in favor of plaintiffs). Further, while ideological 
differences between judges may be exacerbated by more extreme policies, the 
effect on case outcomes will be asymmetric due to the deferential standards of 
review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and associated judicial 
doctrines.28 During a Democratic administration, by contrast, Republican 
judges will be unsympathetic to the statute’s goals and to the administration 
(both factors essentially neutral towards plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges 
will be sympathetic to both (one factor favoring and the other working against 
plaintiffs). These dynamics will reverse for statutes associated with conservative 
values, such that judicial ideology will be influential during liberal 
administrations but have little effect during conservative ones. The ideological 
outlook of a judge therefore is most likely to be a factor when the politics of a 
presidential administration are most at odds with the legal mandate of a statute 
under review.  
The Article is divided into three principal parts. We review the existing 
literature on the influence of judicial ideology in federal courts in Part I, 
focusing on the more complex dynamics of appellate courts and current theories 
of judicial decision-making. In Part II, we present our study results and discuss 
the inferences that can be drawn from several statistical regressions. The broad 
descriptive statistics highlight the modest influence of judicial ideology in the 
decisions of district and appellate courts, whereas the regression results provide 
insights into the relative importance of different factors on case outcomes—the 
influence of judicial ideology, presidential politics, and circuit-level attributes 
(i.e., volume of cases, political balances of judges within a circuit, and any 
systematic ideological bias of judges in a circuit). This analysis provides a more 
complete picture of the factors that mediate the impact of a judge’s ideological 
outlook on judicial review. Finally, Part III examines the normative and 
                                                                                                                     
 28 For judges politically aligned with the administration, their only option is deferring 
to the agency on issues concerning agency fact-finding, statutory interpretation, or the 
adequacy of agency reason-giving, whereas judges with opposing political views can 
overturn agency action in any of these areas. 
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practical implications of our results. We argue that the influence of judicial 
ideology can enhance the likelihood of judicial checks on executive overreach, 
but we caution that this is contingent on structural features of the federal courts 
system and, in the administrative law context, the deferential nature of judicial 
review. The insights provided by the expanded framework we propose is then 
illustrated by applying that framework to three contemporary debates that center 
on structural and jurisdictional aspects of the federal courts—proposals to break 
up the Ninth Circuit, statutory provisions creating exclusive jurisdiction over 
certain types of cases in specific courts, and partisan schemes to dramatically 
expand the number of federal judges. 
II. JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY AND THE MODERATING EFFECT OF CONSENSUS 
VOTING 
Studies examining the influence of judicial ideology on case outcomes date 
back to the early 1990s.29 Over this time, the analytical methods have evolved 
from simple hypothesis testing to multivariate methods and sophisticated study 
designs developed to elucidate the influence of appellate judges on each other.30 
At the same time, the areas of law studied have expanded from discrete fields, 
such as environmental law, and specific courts, typically the D.C. Circuit, to 
national studies that encompassed the most ideologically freighted fields of law, 
including civil rights, labor law, affirmative action, constitutional takings, and 
capital punishment.31 Throughout much of this work, the party of the appointing 
president is used as a proxy for the ideological outlook of federal judges, with 
judges appointed by Democratic presidents presumed to be “liberal” and judges 
appointed by Republican presidents presumed to be “conservative.”32 
Moreover, despite a proliferation of alternative, seemingly more sophisticated 
proxies, the party of the appointing president remains a valid and robust proxy 
for judicial ideology.33 
Numerous hypotheses have been tested over the years, often formulated 
through the lens of principal-agent theory.34 For example, scholars have 
                                                                                                                     
 29 See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra note 13, at 984, 988. 
 30 See, e.g., Hazelton et al., supra note 13, at 447. 
 31 See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 7, at 311–12. 
 32 See Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1718–19.  
 33 Compare Fischman, Voting Patterns, supra note 13, at 819 (observing that “[w]hile 
[the party of the appointing president is] admittedly a simplistic measure of judicial ideology, 
this variable has been demonstrated to robustly correlate with judicial voting behavior across 
a wide variety of issue areas”), and Jessie Allen, A Theory of Adjudication: Law as Magic, 
41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773, 822 (2008) (“The studies confirm that among federal appellate 
judges, the party affiliation of the president who appointed a judge is a fairly strong predictor 
of how the judge will rule in some types of cases whose outcomes are ideologically 
polarized.”), with Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How 
Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 155 (2009) (noting that “proxy 
variables have traditionally included the party of the President who appointed the judge”). 
 34 Lindquist & Haire, supra note 13, at 234–35. 
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evaluated whether strong congressional support for a challenged policy 
increases the likelihood that judges will decide cases in its favor; whether 
district and appellate court judges will be more (less) likely to decide cases in 
favor of a policy when it is supported by the Supreme Court; and whether judges 
appointed by a Democratic (Republican) president will be more (less) likely to 
decide a case in favor of a liberal (conservative) policy.35 This work has shown 
that the influence of Congress is typically weak and short-lived,36 and that the 
influence of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is by far the most important 
factor, although it too is found to have a relatively short half-life.37 The work on 
judicial ideology, particularly in the Supreme Court and appellate courts, has 
generated a greater mix of results and competing theories of judicial decision-
making, with no single theory clearly receiving consensus support.38 To this 
day, theories of judicial decisions premised on “deliberative processes,”39 
“whistleblowing dissents,”40 “collegial concurrences,”41 and “group 
polarization”42 are debated and remain in contention with each other. We will 
review the evolution of the leading empirical studies, focusing on appellate 
                                                                                                                     
 35 Id. at 240–46 (concluding that busy judges will defer to expert agencies). 
 36 Id. at 255 (finding little evidence that presidential administrations influenced circuit 
court decisions); Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1735 (suggesting, but not finding, that 
the political balance of Congress could affect judicial votes due to the risk of a legislative 
override). 
 37 Lindquist & Haire, supra note 13, at 255–56; Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 
1767–68 (finding support for the hypothesis that “judges act more ideologically when their 
decisions are unlikely to be reviewed,” notably where only procedural challenges were at 
issue, and that the Supreme Court, rather than Congress or the president, had the greatest 
influence on D.C. Circuit judges).  
 38 See Hazelton et al., supra note 13, at 447–51 (discussing the competing theories of 
judicial decision-making). 
 39 Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1732–34 (explaining that, according to the 
“deliberation hypothesis” and “dissent hypothesis,” judges moderate their respective 
positions through reasoned analysis of cases). 
 40 Cross & Tiller, supra note 13, at 2156 (stating that that the potential that a 
“whistleblower” on an appellate panel “whose policy preferences differ from the 
majority’s . . . will expose the majority’s manipulation or disregard of the applicable legal 
doctrine” greatly diminishes the influence of ideology). 
 41 Sunstein et al., supra note 7, at 337–38 (providing a variety of reasons for the 
prominence of “collegial concurrence” on ideologically mixed panels, ranging from the 
impact of collective deliberations, to the burden and perceived futility of writing a dissent, 
to conflict aversion among judges). The “dissent hypothesis” overlaps with collegial 
concurrences, but it is limited to judges in the ideological minority moderating their position 
to be consistent with the majority to avoid the burden of writing a dissent. Revesz, Ideology, 
supra note 13, at 1732–34. 
 42 Sunstein et al., supra note 7, at 340–41 (attributing “group polarization” and the 
tendency to “go to extremes” of ideologically uniform panels to the lack of opposing views 
and arguments, the propensity for like-minded views to be self-reinforcing, and social 
pressures between judges to align their views with those of their colleagues). 
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courts because so few studies of district courts exist, and critically assess their 
implications.43  
A. Empirical Studies of Politics in Judicial Decision-Making 
Professor Richard Revesz published an early study of judicial ideology in 
1997 that focused on environmental decisions in the D.C. Circuit between 1970 
and 1994.44 Revesz’s findings centered on three hypotheses: (1) that the political 
outlook of appellate judges would influence their decisions;45 (2) that 
ideological voting would be a greater factor in cases less likely to be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court;46 and (3) that “panel effects” driven by the politics of 
judges on appellate panels would influence their decisions.47 While the results 
had many nuances, the politics of the plaintiff(s) and panel effects were 
observed to be important factors.48 The most consistent finding was that 
appellate judges favored plaintiffs with interests consistent with their own 
ideological preferences.49 By contrast, panel effects were more variable and 
found to be particularly strong in industry challenges—both Republican and 
Democratic judges “voted more ideologically on panels [with] at least one 
colleague of the same party,” and the influence was substantially greater on all-
Republican panels.50 Revesz concluded that his data provided, at best, mixed 
support for the “deliberation” and “dissent” hypotheses, with the only support 
coming from industry challenges.51 In addition, Revesz found some evidence 
that Republican judges were more likely to uphold decisions of the U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
 43 But cf. Herbert M. Kritzer, Polarized Justice? Changing Patterns of Decision-
Making in the Federal Courts, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 309, 373 (2019) (finding evidence 
of increasing polarization among district court judges, but to a lesser extent than among 
Supreme Court justices, and positing that this difference may be because district judges’ 
decision-making “is primarily driven by law, facts, and precedent rather than their own 
personal policy preferences”). 
 44 Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1721. 
 45 Specifically, Democratic judges will be more likely to reverse the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) if the plaintiff is an environmental organization, 
whereas Republican judges will be more likely to reverse EPA if an industry group is the 
plaintiff. Id. at 1728.  
 46 Revesz reasoned that, because procedural matters tend to be “very fact specific” and 
rarely “involve . . . legal principle[s] of general applicability,” the Supreme Court very 
seldom grants certiorari on such issues. Id. at 1729–31.  
 47 Id. at 1719. Revesz suggested further that “the party affiliation of the other judges on 
the panel [will have] a greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation.” Id. 
 48 For example, Revesz observed that environmental organizations have “far greater 
success” in statutory cases than industry challengers and suggested that this difference could 
be due to stricter triaging of cases given their limited resources. Id. at 1749. 
 49 Id. at 1742–43. However, while Republican judges were significantly more likely to 
rule against the government in procedural challenges brought by industry, this was not true 
of Democratic judges when the plaintiff was an environmental organization. Id. at 1749. 
 50 Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1756. 
 51 Id. 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “when they are defended in court by 
a Republican administration, and that Democratic judges [will be] more likely 
to do the reverse.”52 
Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller53 published a similarly groundbreaking 
study centered on judicial review of statutory interpretation by federal agencies 
under the Chevron54 doctrine.55 Premising their analysis on a whistleblower 
hypothesis,56 they argued that an appellate panel would be more likely to 
comply with a legal doctrine “when [it] is politically or ideologically divided.”57 
Their empirical results revealed that appellate panels were 31% more likely to 
defer to an agency’s interpretation when the policy under review was in 
alignment with the panel majority’s political preferences.58 Further, they found 
that while ideologically divided panels adhered to the deferential Chevron 
standard 62% of the time, ideologically uniform panels did so in only 33% of 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Id. at 1735. 
 53 Cross & Tiller, supra note 13, at 2155. 
 54 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
Chevron enunciates a two-step standard for judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretations. Id. As interpreted by the lower courts, if a statute is clear, review is de novo. 
Id. at 842−43; U.S. Sugar Corp v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat'l 
Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
at step one of Chevron, the court must “first examine the statute de novo, employing 
traditional tools of statutory construction”)); Sung Kil Jang v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 1187, 1190 
(9th Cir. 2015) (“At step one of the familiar Chevron analysis, we ask whether, ‘applying 
the normal tools of statutory construction,’ the statute is ambiguous, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289, 321 n.45 (2001); we consider this question de novo.”); Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 
156, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (“At Chevron step one, we consider de novo whether Congress has 
clearly spoken to the question at issue.”). If the statute is ambiguous, however, courts are 
obliged to defer to any permissible (reasonable) interpretation by the agency. Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843. 
 55 Cross and Tiller cite several preceding studies in the early 1990s of judicial review 
under Chevron that were ultimately inconclusive regarding the significance of judicial 
ideology. Cross & Tiller, supra note 13, at 2163 n.26, 2166 n.53; see Linda R. Cohen & 
Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 68 (1994) 
(describing how a conservative Supreme Court signals to lower courts when to grant greater 
deference to conservative agencies); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 13, at 991 (arguing that 
Chevron represented a major change in administrative law and standards for judicial review 
of an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard 
E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative 
Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1052 (1995) (concluding that Chevron freed appellate courts 
to render essentially political, outcome-oriented decisions). 
 56 Cross & Tiller, supra note 13, at 2156. 
 57 Id. at 2159. 
 58 Id. at 2169, 2171 (concluding that “when the agency’s policy outcome is consistent 
with the policy preferences of the panel’s majority, the court is more likely to defer than if 
there is no such convergence”). 
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the cases.59 The authors concluded that “the presence of a whistleblower makes 
it almost twice as likely that [Chevron] will be followed when doctrine works 
against the partisan policy preferences of the court majority.”60 Cross and 
Tiller’s paper bolstered the empirical grounds for the influence of judicial 
ideology on appellate courts and provided the clearest support to that date for 
the mitigating effects of politically divided panels. 
Professor Cass R. Sunstein along with several co-authors has published a 
series of papers further exploring the impact of the ideological composition of 
appellate panels on case outcomes.61 In a 2004 paper, he and his co-authors 
examined the panel effects in appeals that spanned a broad range of subject 
areas.62 Their principal findings were (1) that judges in the political minority on 
politically divided panels often issue “collegial concurrences” that correspond 
closely to the views of their panel colleagues; and (2) that judges on politically 
uniform panels often succumb to “group polarization” when they amplify each 
other’s ideological preferences.63 This study is also one of the few to examine 
differences across circuits.64 The authors’ strongest finding was that case 
outcomes were closely correlated with the balance of Republican and 
Democratic judges in a circuit; specifically, the opinions in the Ninth and 
Second Circuits were observed to be significantly more liberal than those in the 
other circuits.65  
In two subsequent papers, Professors Sunstein and Thomas Miles evaluated 
the influence of ideology on judicial review of agency action.66 Focusing 
exclusively on cases filed against the EPA and the National Labor Relations 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Id. at 2171–72 (observing that “although the significance of these results is somewhat 
less (p = 0.09)[,] . . . it is 17% less likely that the court will defer [under the Chevron 
doctrine] when it is unified than when it is split 2-1”). 
 60 Id. at 2172. 
 61 Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 823; Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra 
note 5, at 766; Sunstein et al., supra note 7, at 304. 
 62 Sunstein et al., supra note 7, at 304. The legal fields included affirmative action, 
campaign finance, sex discrimination, disability discrimination, race discrimination, and 
environmental regulation. Id. 
 63 Id. at 337–38, 340. The authors found that group polarization was most pronounced 
on panels with exclusively Republican-appointed judges, who “vote[d] against industry 
challenges” in environmental cases “just 27% of the time,” whereas panels with a Republican 
majority did so in 50% of the cases, and those with a single Republican judge did so in 63%. 
Id. at 323. 
 64 See id. at 307. 
 65 Id. at 332. The authors found that “[t]he rankings, in terms of ideology, correlate 
strongly but not perfectly with the percentage of Democratic appointees on the relevant court 
in 2002 (r = .59),” and that disparities in case outcomes between exclusively Democratic and 
exclusively Republican panels in each circuit varied from less than 8% in the Third, Seventh, 
and Fifth Circuits to 27% in the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
 66 Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 825; Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra 
note 5, at 766.  
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Board (NLRB),67 the studies examined judicial voting patterns in cases 
reviewing agency decisions defined as “conservative” if the plaintiff was a 
public-interest organization and “liberal” if the plaintiff was a business entity.68 
Following the work of Tiller and Cross, the first study focused on judicial review 
under the Chevron doctrine and the results of this study reinforced those of the 
prior one.69 The authors found that Democratic appointees were fourteen 
percentage points more likely to affirm liberal agency decisions than Republican 
appointees, while Republican appointees were nineteen percentage points more 
likely to affirm conservative agency decisions than Democratic appointees.70 
Their results also showed that panel effects were an overriding factor: the 
presence of just one judge appointed by the opposing political party essentially 
neutralized the influence of ideology.71 In summary, the authors concluded that 
most of the differences observed in case outcomes were attributable to group 
polarization on ideologically uniform panels.72 
The second Miles and Sunstein study focused on judicial review under the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of the APA.73 The most striking feature of 
their results is a “seesaw pattern” in Republican and Democratic voting, which 
they characterize as the “smoking gun” of ideological voting.74 Specifically, 
“[w]hen the agency decision is liberal, the Democratic validation rate is 72 
percent and the Republican validation rate is 58 percent. When the agency 
decision is conservative, the Democratic validation rate drops to 55 percent and 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 825 (noting that the authors coded all 
published opinions between 1990 and 2004; of the 253 opinions, “183 involved the EPA, 
and 70 involved the NLRB”); Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 5, at 774 (involving 
coding of all published opinions between 1996 and 2006; of the 653 opinions, 554 involved 
the NLRB and 99 involved the EPA). 
 68 Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 830–31 (explaining that an agency 
decision was coded as “conservative” or as “liberal” based, “simply and crudely, by 
reference to the identity of the party challenging it”). The authors eschew using the party of 
the president at the time the case was heard because administrations typically make a mix of 
conservative and liberal decisions; empirically, they also observe little differences in judicial 
voting across administrations. Id. at 850 tbl.8, 860 (finding about a twenty-four percentage-
point difference between Democratic and Republican judges during Democratic 
administrations versus a thirteen percentage point difference during Republican 
administrations). 
 69 Compare Cross & Tiller, supra note 13, at 2172, with Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra 
note 13, at 826–27. 
 70 Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 826–27, 849. These differences more 
than doubled for ideologically uniform panels to thirty-one percentage points for Democratic 
panels reviewing liberal agency decisions and forty-nine percentage points for Republican 
panels reviewing conservative agency decisions. Id. at 855 tbl.9, 856. 
 71 Id. at 858. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 5, at 773–74. Similar to the Chevron study, 
this study also “classif[ied] agency decisions as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ on the basis of the 
identity of the party making the challenge.” Id. at 775.  
 74 Id. at 806. 
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the Republican validation rate rises to 72 percent.”75 However, virtually all of 
the seesawing they observed was associated with the NLRB opinions, which 
accounted for 85% of the cases, whereas case outcomes before Republican and 
Democratic judges differed by just two percentage points in the EPA opinions.76 
The small sample sizes for the subclasses of conservative opinions and 
ideologically uniform panels also limited the statistical grounding of their 
results.77 Nevertheless, the authors suggest that the disparities in voting are 
largely driven by ideologically uniform panels, citing the twenty-nine 
percentage point disparity in affirmation rates between all-Democratic and all-
Republican panels.78 Further, although they concede that judicial ideology was 
not a “dominant” factor,79 they caution that “[a]n unbalanced federal judiciary 
might well act as a brake on agencies’ ability to implement the liberal or 
conservative policies of a new executive.”80 
Subsequent studies have incorporated a variety of statistical methods and 
designs to elucidate the panel effects in appellate courts.81 While the newest 
studies continue to find strong evidence that ideology is a factor in the decisions 
                                                                                                                     
 75 Id. at 767. Similar to the earlier study, they did not observe statistically significant 
differences across administrations. Id. at 782–83, 783 tbl.2. Looking at their data, “[d]uring 
Democratic Presidencies, the validation rates of Democratic appointees in these cases were 
[fourteen] percentage points higher than that of Republican appointees, and during 
Republican Presidencies, this difference was only [six] percentage points.” Id. at 783.  
 76 Id. at 774, 779. Republican judges voted to validate EPA decisions in 73% of the 
cases versus 71% for Democratic judges. Id. at 779, 779 fig.1. By contrast, the validation 
rate of Democratic appointees for NLRB and EPA cases together was ten percentage points 
higher than that of Republican appointees. Id. at 777 tbl.1. Moreover, this difference cannot 
be accounted for by countervailing trends for liberal and conservative decisions by EPA 
because almost 90% of the cases (580 out of 653) involved liberal decisions. See id. 
 77 Id. at 790. 
 78 Id. at 788–89.  
 79 Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 5, at 807 (stating that “our data 
demonstrate that judicial ideology is not playing a dominant role and that judicial policy 
choices are not driving arbitrariness review”). 
 80 Id. at 811 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, they state that “[o]ur findings offer 
a clear prediction for the future: when a judiciary consisting mostly of Democratic appointees 
confronts a conservative executive branch, the rate of invalidations will be unusually high, 
and so too when a judiciary consisting mostly of Republican appointees confronts a liberal 
executive branch.” Id. at 768. 
 81 See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: 
INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 2–3 (2006) (explaining their 
analysis); Fischman, Estimating Preferences, supra note 13, at 781 (discussing the model 
used in the study); Fischman, Voting Patterns, supra note 13, at 808 (discussing how the 
approach is different from other empirical studies); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel 
Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
421, 421 (2007) (explaining the model used in their study); Richard L. Revesz, Litigation 
and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on 
Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 686, 688 (2000) (discussing the 
purpose and layout of the study); Spitzer & Talley, supra note 13, at 638 (explaining the 
model used in their study).  
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of appellate judges,82 the strong norm of consensus is consistently found to be 
a crucial mitigating factor.83 Among the recent work, Joshua Fischman has 
conducted several of the most innovative studies of panel effects. In a 2011 
study of immigration cases in the Ninth Circuit, Fischman finds that Democratic 
appointees supported asylum claimants in 25% of the cases they heard, whereas 
Republican appointees did so in just 12%.84 Similar to Miles and Sunstein, he 
finds that judges’ opinions were reinforced on ideologically uniform panels and 
moderated on ideologically mixed ones.85 Fischman concludes that “the 
hypothesis that judges vote independently can be rejected” and that “a norm of 
consensus pushes judges’ voting rates toward the mean.”86 Fischman quantifies 
this effect through a simulation, which estimates that judges voted consistent 
with their personal views in only 55% of the cases.87 The striking disconnect 
that Fischman uncovers between judges’ political outlooks and their voting 
refutes claims that low dissent rates reflect the relative ease of deciding cases 
and limited discretion that judges have in resolving them.88  
In a subsequent meta-analysis of eleven prior studies and three new 
datasets,89 Fischman provides compelling evidence that judges are influenced 
by their colleagues’ votes in a case rather than their colleagues’ ideological 
outlook.90 Across a wide range of legal areas, Fischman finds that “each 
colleague’s vote increases a judge’s probability of voting in the same direction 
                                                                                                                     
 82 See, e.g., Fischman, Estimating Preferences, supra note 13, at 793. 
 83 See, e.g., JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF 
COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS 102 tbl.6 (2002) (observing that about 95% of appellate cases have no dissent, 
which reflects a strong norm of consensus among judges); Fischman, Estimating 
Preferences, supra note 13, at 803–04 (recognizing the influence of “consensus voting”). 
 84 Fischman, Estimating Preferences, supra note 13, at 793. 
 85 See id. (finding that all-Democratic panels decided for the asylum claimant 35% of 
the time, majority-Democratic panels 20% of the time, majority-Republican panels 15% of 
the time, and all-Republican panels 6% of the time). 
 86 Id. at 796–98 (finding that a “consensus voting model correctly classifies 76 percent 
of votes, the sincere voting model correctly classifies 67 percent, and the party-of-
appointment model correctly classifies 65 percent”). 
 87 Id. at 803. 
 88 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of 
Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 838; Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an 
Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 470 (2007). 
 89 Fischman also exposes shortcomings in prior studies that qualify their findings 
statistically; specifically, because they rely on judges’ political affiliation as a regressor, the 
statistical models are misspecified due to endogenous effects. Fischman, Voting Patterns, 
supra note 13, at 820–21. 
 90 See id. at 809 (describing the study as “compar[ing] two empirical models of panel 
voting—one that models influence using colleagues’ characteristics, the other using 
colleagues’ votes—and reexamin[ing] data from 11 prior studies of panel voting and three 
novel data sets”). Fischman characterizes voting as an “endogenous” effect and judicial 
ideology as a “contextual” effect: “Endogenous effects occur when an individual’s behavior 
is influenced by the behavior of the group. Contextual effects occur when an individual’s 
behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the group members.” Id. at 811. 
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by roughly 40 percentage points,”91 whereas the influence of a colleague’s 
ideological outlook varies widely depending on the nature of the case.92 To put 
this in perspective, Fischman estimates that the influence of colleagues’ votes is 
equivalent to roughly 80% of the effect that would be observed if appellate 
panels operated exclusively by consensus.93 In other words, panel effects that 
mitigate the influence of judicial ideology are largely driven by the strong norm 
of consensus among appellate judges. Fischman suggests that this lends 
credence to theories, such as “dissent aversion” and “whistleblowing,” that turn 
on votes in a specific case rather than colleagues’ generally held ideological 
perspectives,94 whereas deliberative theories are less plausible because they 
implicate the ideological perspectives of the judges.95 This study provides the 
clearest empirical grounds for distinguishing among these competing theories. 
Fischman concludes by estimating the influence of judicial ideology in 
conjunction with mediating panel effects. To do this, he posits that disparities 
in case outcomes between all-Democratic and all-Republican panels 
“correspond to average differences between Democratic and Republican judges 
if they voted autonomously.”96 Overall, he finds that the differences between 
ideologically uniform panels will be 2.3 times larger than the differences 
observed between individual Republican and Democratic judges.97 This ratio 
                                                                                                                     
 91 Id. at 809−10. According to Fischman, “The impact of the norm of consensus appears 
to be uniform across high- and low-profile cases, in complex cases as well as simple ones, 
and in all circuits studied.” Id. at 829. 
 92 See id. at 827–29 (finding that “[t]he number of Democratic panel colleagues has a 
significant effect on a judge’s vote in nine of the 14 regressions, and the impact of each 
colleague’s party is typically one-half to two-thirds as large as the impact of a judge’s own 
party”). 
 93 See id. at 810–11 (observing that “[t]he distinction between these effects depends 
upon whether the colleagues’ characteristics have a direct impact on the judge’s vote or 
whether the colleagues’ characteristics predict their votes, which in turn influence the judge’s 
vote”). 
 94 Id. at 811–12 (“[Under] the ‘dissent aversion’ theory, a judge’s willingness to vote 
in a particular direction is affected by the other judges’ votes. Judges’ votes may be 
correlated with their colleagues’ characteristics, but only insofar as these characteristics 
predict the colleagues’ votes. Similarly, ‘whistleblowing’ is a theory of endogenous effects, 
since the majority is influenced by the minority judge’s willingness to dissent.”). 
 95 See Fischman, Voting Patterns, supra note 13, at 812 (suggesting that personal 
beliefs may cause judges to work harder to find information or legal theories to support a 
liberal vote, which will in turn influence their colleagues’ votes). 
 96 Id. at 834–35 (emphasis added). Fischman further observes that:  
It represents the average difference in voting rates between the two types of judges, 
given that they are constrained by panel colleagues. It does not predict how Democratic 
and Republican judges would differ if voting autonomously. Nor does it capture the full 
causal effect of substituting Democratic judges for Republican judges, since it does not 
account for the impact of such substitutions on panel colleagues.  
Id. at 835. 
 97 Id. at 835. 
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reflects the degree to which the views of the average judge are moderated on 
ideologically mixed panels relative to their voting patterns if they were to vote 
autonomously.98 Using these estimates, he finds that “different panels would 
reach different results at least 20% of the time, and perhaps much more,” 
assuming dissent rates that are typical of federal courts.99 While the contingency 
rate he derives for panel-dependent case outcomes is significant, it is 
substantially lower than the 30%–40% disparities between ideologically 
uniform panels often highlighted in prior studies.100 Fischman’s work provides 
a rigorous measure of the mediating effect that randomized three-judge panels 
have on judicial ideology when the judiciary is ideologically balanced.101 The 
picture that emerges is decidedly mixed—ideological differences between 
judges are much greater than dissent rates would suggest, but they are held in 
check by a strong norm of consensus and the low relative frequency of 
ideologically uniform panels. 
In a more recent project, Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd, and Christopher 
Walker, based on a database of more than 1600 circuit court decisions over an 
eleven-year period, assessed the extent to which judicial ideology affects review 
of agency statutory interpretations.102 The authors concluded that “politics play 
some role in how circuit courts review agency statutory interpretations,” with 
conservative (liberal) panels being more likely to agree with conservative 
(liberal) agency interpretations.103 They found, however, that “panels of all 
ideological stripes use the [Chevron] framework similarly and reveal modest 
ideological behavior.”104 Unlike Tiller and Cross, Barnett, Boyd, and Walker 
found no “whistleblower effects” in appellate court application of Chevron, 
concluding that: 
                                                                                                                     
 98 Id. at 834–35. Fischman derives a within-panel multiplier for judges, as opposed to 
the average judge on each side and finds that in most cases it ranges from 3.6 to 8.2. Id. at 
836. 
 99 Id. at 836. Fischman notes that “[e]specially, ironic is Kress’s claim that ‘[i]t would 
be surprising to find that the dissent rate was four percent yet judges disagreed in forty 
percent of all cases,’ since his implied 10:1 ratio is easily within the plausible range for the 
within-panel multiplier.” Id. at 836–38 (internal citation omitted). 
 100 See id. at 837 tbl.5, 838. 
 101 Fischman, Voting Patterns, supra note 13, at 838. 
 102 See generally Kent Barnett et al., Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 1463 (2018). For additional empirical evaluation of panel effects on judicial 
review of agency statutory interpretations, see Hazelton et al., supra note 13, at 467−73. 
 103 Barnett et al., supra note 102, at 1468. 
 104 Id. They add: 
For instance, both liberal and conservative panels are more likely to find the statute 
unambiguous when the agency’s interpretation is contrary to the panel’s ideological 
preferences. Likewise, both liberal and conservative panels are more likely to find the 
statute ambiguous when the agency’s interpretation aligns with the panels’ ideological 
preferences. This means that panels permit agencies more policymaking space when the 
administrative interpretations are consistent with the panels’ views. 
Id. at 1468–69. 
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[W]hether a panel is ideologically uniform or diverse does not affect whether 
circuit courts apply the Chevron framework, nor does it affect agency-win rates 
on judicial review. Indeed, we saw only minor differences at either ideological 
extreme (where we would have most anticipated whistleblowing effects to 
occur), and those differences were in the opposite direction than expected.105 
The authors explain this apparently “startling” result as a product of 
Chevron’s powerful constraint on the influence of partisanship in judicial 
decision-making, leaving little room for a panel’s ideological composition to 
play an additional constraining role.106 Thus, the authors conclude the 
elimination or weakening of Chevron deference, as some scholars and judges 
have called for,107 could enhance the role of partisanship in judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretations and foster greater interpretive disparities.108 
Professors Barnett, Boyd, and Walker conducted another study, based on 
analysis of circuit court opinions handed down between 2003 and 2013, in 
which they assessed the political dynamics of deciding whether to apply 
Chevron deference.109 They concluded that judges do not consistently apply 
Chevron.110 In particular, they found that liberal, moderate, and conservative 
panels of appellate court judges are nearly equally likely to apply Chevron 
deference when reviewing liberal agency interpretations.111 When reviewing 
conservative agency interpretations, however, “liberal panels apply Chevron 
significantly less frequently than conservative panels.”112 The authors argue 
that, in light of these findings, “notable prior empirical studies reporting that 
judges’ political preferences drive case outcomes when utilizing the Chevron 
doctrine underreport the political dynamics at play in this arena.”113 
                                                                                                                     
 105 Id. at 1469–70. 
 106 Id. at 1470. 
 107 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron “permit[s] executive bureaucracies to 
swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power 
in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ 
design”); see also Kristin E. Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch 
and Chevron Deference, 70 ALA. L. REV. 733, 737 (2019) (noting the likelihood that Justice 
Gorsuch “will continue pushing the Court to curtail or even repudiate . . . Chevron”). 
 108 Barnett et al., supra note 102, at 1470. 
 109 See generally Kent Barnett et al., The Politics of Selecting Chevron Deference, 15 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 597 (2018). 
 110 See id. at 599. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. Liberal judges apply Chevron as much as 16% less frequently than conservative 
judges when reviewing conservative agency interpretations. Id. at 614. 
 113 Id. at 599 (emphasis added). The authors also found no evidence of whistleblower or 
disciplining effects on mixed panels. Id. They posit that the increased flexibility courts have 
in deciding whether to apply Chevron after cases such as United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218 (2001), which was decided before their study period began, may have lessened the 
need for “doctrine-based whistleblowing.” Id. at 616. 
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B. Viewing Judicial Politics in Absolute Rather than Relative Terms 
All of the existing studies present their results in relative terms as percentage 
differences, with little or no indication of the absolute number of cases at 
stake.114 This oversight is important because ideologically uniform panels 
account for roughly 26% of the cases litigated, assuming roughly equal numbers 
of Republican and Democratic judges.115 For example, in the Sunstein and 
Miles study of judicial review under the Chevron doctrine, there were twenty-
two all-Democratic panels and forty all-Republican panels, which together 
accounted for about 25% of the total.116 If you assume that the affirmation rates 
for the mixed panels reflected an “ideologically neutral” position, the “proper” 
affirmation rate would be roughly 62%.117 Under this reading, all-Democratic 
panels would be overly deferential to agencies in about 25% of the liberal cases 
and not deferential enough in 8% of the conservative cases, whereas all-
Republican panels would not be sufficiently deferential in 12% of the liberal 
cases and would be too deferential in 38% of the conservative cases. In absolute 
terms, four cases with all-Democratic judges and eight cases with all-
Republican judges would have been wrongly decided over twenty-five years.118 
This amounts to a “departure rate” from neutrality of 5%, which while not de 
minimis, does not appear to be unreasonable—particularly given the vagueness 
of the Chevron doctrine. A similar departure rate, 4% (27 out of 653 cases over 
eleven years), is observed in Sunstein and Miles’s study of judicial review under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard.119  
The importance of considering absolute numbers of cases applies to all of 
the empirical studies to date, which report differences between ideologically 
mixed and uniform panels of roughly 10%–40%. Assuming, for example, an 
average of 25% for the “departure rate” from neutrality of ideologically uniform 
panels and relatively equal numbers of Democratic and Republican judges, the 
overall departure rate for ideologically uniform panels would be about 6%. 
                                                                                                                     
 114 See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 870. 
 115 See id. at 855 tbl.9. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id.  
 118 All-Democratic panels heard a total of fourteen liberal cases and 25% of fourteen is 
three cases, and they heard eight conservative cases, and 8% of eight is one (rounding up), 
for a total of four erroneous opinions. See id. Similarly, all-Republican panels heard a total 
of twenty-seven liberal cases and 12% of twenty-seven is 3.2 cases, and they heard thirteen 
conservative cases, and 38% of thirteen is 4.4, for a total of eight (rounding up) erroneous 
opinions. See id. 
 119 Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 5, at 788 tbl.3. In this study, the validation 
rate for mixed panels was 65%, and the all-Democratic panels were overly deferential in 
about 16% of the liberal cases and not deferential enough in 27% of the conservative cases, 
whereas Republican judges were not sufficiently deferential in 12% of the liberal cases and 
were too deferential in 17% of the conservative cases. See id. Thus, the decisions of ten all-
Democratic panels and seventeen all-Republican panels were wrongly decided, for a total of 
twenty-seven out of 653 (4%) over eleven years, or about 2.5 per year. Id. 
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However, as the Sunstein and Miles studies illustrate, the actual number of 
“ideologically decided” cases annually will be very low, no more than a handful, 
in most areas of law.120 Further, aggregate national statistics ignore the 
geographic structure of the appellate court system, which is in part designed to 
reflect differing ideological preferences across the country.121 This variability 
is implicit in the deference given to senators for the states encompassed by the 
circuit to which a judge is being appointed; the appointment process is designed 
to ensure that the outlook and jurisprudence of federal judges will, at least in 
part, reflect the perspectives of the states from which the cases they hear 
originate.122  
One of the most important points we draw from the literature is the 
resilience of the federal judiciary to ideological variance across judges. This is 
an inherent byproduct of randomized selection of three-judge panels in federal 
appellate courts.123 In the current political context, it is especially important to 
be measured when interpreting the results of empirical studies on the influence 
of judicial ideology. Overall, the existing empirical studies provide few grounds 
for concluding that ideology is an overriding factor in appellate cases—in 
absolute or relative terms; in many areas of law, the studies suggest that ideology 
will affect a handful of cases over the course of a decade at the appellate level.124 
Further, national statistics can be misleading insofar as they convolve inter-
circuit variance, which is built into the system, and inter-judge variance, which 
is potentially more problematic. Understanding the relative importance of 
circuit-level and inter-judge effects remains an open question of critical 
importance to the controversy surrounding judicial appointments and the 
politics of judges. The work reported below examines these inter-circuit effects 
and looks more closely at the influence of presidential politics by evaluating 
differences in case outcomes across administrations, which has been overlooked 
so far in the literature. 
                                                                                                                     
 120 See id.; see also Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 855 tbl.9. 
 121 See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 5, at 765–66. 
 122 See Ryan J. Owens et al., Ideology, Qualifications, and Covert Senate Obstruction 
of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 369–70 (describing the “blue slip” 
process). During the Trump Administration, Republican majorities in the Senate ignored 
blue slips filed by Democratic senators, reflecting the increasingly partisan nature of judicial 
nominations in the Senate. See Seung Min Kim, Grassley Rips up ‘Blue Slip’ for a Pair of 
Trump Court Picks, POLITICO (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/ 
11/16/chuck-grassley-trump-court-picks-245367 [https://perma.cc/RN6J-4THK]; see 
also Jordain Carney, Senate Reignites Blue Slip War over Trump Court Picks, HILL (Feb. 
24, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/431232-senate-reignites-blue-slip-war-
over-trump-court-picks [https://perma.cc/576W-6AR5]. 
 123 See Fischman, Estimating Preferences, supra note 13, at 782 (noting that the cases 
assigned to and composition of judicial panels are random). 
 124 See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, Policy, supra note 13, at 855 tbl.9. 
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III. REEXAMINING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LIGHT OF CIRCUIT STRUCTURES, 
JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY, AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 
NEPA and the ESA are among the most important and most heavily litigated 
federal environmental statutes.125 Within the broader domain of public law, 
NEPA is exemplary of a purely procedural legal framework that covers all 
federal agencies, whereas the ESA is much narrower in scope and contains a 
mix of procedural elements (that mirror those found in NEPA) and strict 
standards.126 Both statutes implicate important economic interests in the public 
and private spheres, and they often involve highly technical questions that 
require difficult scientific judgments to be made by government officials.127 
These characteristics create a valuable context in which to assess the influence 
of judicial ideology, as they raise countervailing factors that weigh for or against 
deferring to agency judgment. For example, the complexity and uncertainty in 
environmental science often favors greater deference to agencies, particularly 
on substantive regulatory determinations, but the procedural focus and express 
purpose of each statute to promote adequate consideration of environmental 
impacts by federal agencies is premised on a less deferential approach to judicial 
review. In addition, to the extent that purely procedural questions are less likely 
to be reviewed by appellate courts or the Supreme Court, there is evidence that 
judicial ideology has greater influence on case outcomes.128  
NEPA, which went into effect on January 1, 1970, established a national 
policy to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent, or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] 
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to the Nation.”129 
It declares a “continuing policy of the Federal government . . . to use all 
practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under 
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, 
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans.”130  
                                                                                                                     
 125 See Malcom & Li, supra note 18, at 15,844; see also Miller, supra note 18, at 223–
24. 
 126 Compare National Environment Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012), with 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
 127 Malcom & Li, supra note 18, at 15,845; see also Miller, supra note 18, at 223–24. 
 128 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1031, 
1044–45 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that judicial review is appropriate for reviewing 
procedural decisions in a limited context). 
 129 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
 130 Id. § 4331(a). To fulfill this policy, the statute makes it “the continuing responsibility 
of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential 
considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, 
programs, and resources.” Id. § 4331(b). 
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Notwithstanding these ambitious goals, NEPA has only one significant 
operative provision. It directs all federal agencies to “include in every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement,”131 which is referred to as an environmental impact statement (EIS), 
that assesses the proposal’s environmental impact.132 Each EIS is also required 
to consider the alternatives to the proposed action, including a comparative 
evaluation of their environmental impacts.133 If an agency determines that a 
proposed action lacks one of the triggers for preparation of an EIS, most 
commonly that it will not have significant environmental impacts, it may 
prepare an environmental assessment (EA) along with a finding of no significant 
impact.134 However, judicial review is limited to procedural violations, such as 
failure to prepare an EIS when the statute required one135 or preparation of an 
inadequate EIS.136 
The ESA’s goals are similarly ambitious. Its declared purposes are “to 
provide a means whereby the ecosystem upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the 
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.”137 Two 
agencies are responsible for overseeing implementation of the ESA, the Interior 
Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Commerce 
Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (the Services).138 
They are charged with listing species that qualify as endangered or threatened139 
and designating their critical habitat.140 The statute provides for the preparation 
of recovery plans for listed species,141 although the plans are largely immune to 
                                                                                                                     
 131 Id. § 4332(C). 
 132 Id. § 4332(C)(i). 
 133 Id. § 4332(C). Agencies must consider appropriate alternatives even when not 
required to prepare an EIS. Id. § 4332(E). 
 134 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4(a)(2), 1508.13 (2017). 
 135 See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND 
POLICY 300 (8th ed. 2019). 
 136 See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1226 
(10th Cir. 2017). 
 137 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). In addition, Congress declared a policy “that all Federal 
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species 
and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance” of the ESA’s purposes. Id. § 1531(c)(1). 
 138 The NMFS has jurisdiction over anadromous fish and ocean-based aquatic life, while 
the FWS has jurisdiction over freshwater and land-based plants and animals. Jennifer Jeffers, 
Note, Reversing the Trend Towards Species Extinction, or Merely Halting It? Incorporating 
the Recovery Standard into ESA Section 7 Jeopardy Analyses, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 457 
n.3 (2008). 
 139 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(1). For the difference between endangered and threatened 
species, see id. § 1532(6), (20). 
 140 Id. § 1533(a)(2), (b)(2). Critical habitat is defined at id. § 1532(5). 
 141 Id. § 1533(f). 
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judicial challenges.142 Other requirements are enforceable, however. Section 7 
of the ESA imposes a duty on all federal agencies, in consultation with one of 
the Services, to ensure that the actions they authorize, fund, or carry out will not 
“jeopardize” the continued existence of listed species or adversely affect their 
critical habitat.143 This mandate imposes strict procedural and substantive duties 
on federal agencies.144 In addition, Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the taking of 
endangered species by either government agencies or private landowners.145 
The ESA authorizes any person to file a civil action in federal district court to 
enjoin any person, including a federal agency, alleged to be in violation of the 
statute or its implementing regulations.146  
This study analyzes litigation under NEPA and the ESA between 2001 and 
2016. On average, about 100 NEPA cases were filed in district court and about 
twenty-five appeals were filed annually. To make the review process 
manageable, we analyzed samples of about 500 district court and 330 circuit 
court opinions with NEPA claims. The volume of cases was much smaller under 
the ESA, however, with roughly thirty district court cases and about ten appeals 
filed each year. Given these modest numbers, we coded the entire population of 
ESA cases with dispositive opinions issued during this sixteen-year period.147  
Under both statutes, the volume of cases litigated covers a very small 
percent of the actions subject to each statute, which number in the tens of 
thousands annually.148 The relatively small volume of litigation under the two 
statutes suggests that, whether due to strategic considerations or limited 
resources, plaintiffs are selective in the cases they file. The selectivity of the 
cases filed is reflected in the success rates of environmental organizations,149 
                                                                                                                     
 142 See, e.g., Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Fund 
for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 538 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 143 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 144 Courts may enjoin actions on which the agencies should have consulted with the 
Services but failed to do so, for example. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 
1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 145 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). The Supreme Court deferred to the Interior Department’s 
position that habitat modification may amount to a taking. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 
of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 687–88 (1995). 
 146 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). A citizen suit, for example, may seek to compel one of the 
Services to perform its nondiscretionary statutory duty to list a species or designate its critical 
habitat. Id. § 1540(g)(1)(C). 
 147 The details of the empirical methods and protocols are the same as those described 
in David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in 
Environmental Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3 app. at 64–67 (2018) [hereinafter Adelman & 
Glicksman, Judicial Politics], except that we applied these methods to cases decided under 
the ESA as well as NEPA for this Article. 
 148 David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Reevaluating Environmental Citizen 
Suits in Theory and Practice, 91 COLO. L. REV. 385, 385 (2020) [hereinafter Adelman & 
Glicksman, Citizen Suits]. 
 149 We divided plaintiffs into five broad classes: local environmental organizations; 
national environmental organizations; other nongovernmental organizations; businesses and 
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which filed about three-quarters of the cases under NEPA and the ESA.150 The 
success rates of environmental organizations under NEPA and the ESA were 
higher than the averages for challenges to agency action in a wide range of 
empirical studies,151 and they were far higher than during the Bush 
Administration.152 The combination of careful selection of cases and the 
geographic concentration of cases in liberal states suggests that local politics 
were a significant factor in deciding where to file cases. Environmental 
plaintiffs sought to ensure that their cases were both legally meritorious and, to 
the extent possible, that they would not provoke a political backlash from local 
communities. 
A. Patterns of Litigation over Space and Time 
The NEPA and ESA cases we analyzed were concentrated in the Ninth and 
D.C. Circuits. Roughly half of them were filed in the Ninth Circuit and another 
12−15% in the D.C Circuit. In district court, about 60% of the cases under each 
                                                                                                                     
business associations; and cities, counties, states, and tribes. We defined “national 
environmental organizations” narrowly to include a small number of high-profile 
environmental organizations (e.g., Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
National Wildlife Federation, Center for Biological Diversity) to identify the organizations 
that litigated a large share of the NEPA and ESA cases. While there was substantial overlap 
between the organizations that dominated litigation under each statute, there were a few 
organizations in each case that were unique to the specific statute. 
 150 Environmental plaintiffs, whether national or local organizations, were more 
successful—prevailing, on average, at rates ten to twenty percentage points higher—than 
other plaintiffs. 
 151 See Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 5, at 767–68 (reporting data on 
administrative review cases involving EPA indicating that agencies prevailed on average in 
72% of administrative challenges on appeal); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of 
Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 84–85 (2011) 
(synthesizing the results of numerous empirical studies of judicial review and finding that 
agencies prevail in 64%–81% of the cases at the circuit level); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua 
Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2011) (observing that “[c]ourts at all levels of the federal judiciary 
uphold agency actions in about 70% of cases” irrespective of the standard of review that they 
apply). A recent study finds that success rates in adjudicated cases in federal courts fell from 
70% in 1985 to 30% in 2009. Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident 
of the Falling Win Rate: Individual vs System-Level Justification and the Rule of Law, 52 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1371, 1371 (2019). Thus, plaintiff success rates in ESA cases are similar 
to the recent figures on success rates in civil cases generally in the federal courts. 
 152 The disparity in success rates between environmental and other plaintiffs was far 
greater during the Bush than the Obama Administration. Specifically, during the Bush 
Administration environmental organizations prevailed in 45% and other plaintiffs in just 
20% of the cases; during the Obama Administration, they prevailed in 24% and 13%, 
respectively, of the cases. On appeal during the Bush Administration, environmental 
organizations prevailed in 35% of the cases and other plaintiffs prevailed in 16%, whereas 
during the Obama Administration, the success rates converged to 17% and 15%, 
respectively. 
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statute were filed in either the Ninth or Tenth Circuits and 15% were filed in the 
D.C. Circuit (Figures 1–2). Moreover, the distribution of appeals largely 
matches the district court filings.153 Within each circuit, the actions on which 
NEPA and ESA cases originated were also overwhelmingly located in 
politically centrist or Democratic states, or they spanned multiple states. Only 
about 15% of the underlying actions originated in Republican states.154 
  
                                                                                                                     
 153 Under NEPA, 52% of the appeals were in the Ninth Circuit, 10% in the D.C. Circuit, 
12% in the Tenth Circuit, and 5.1% in the Sixth Circuit; under the ESA, 64% of the appeals 
were in the Ninth Circuit, 15% in the D.C. Circuit, 7% in the Eleventh Circuit, and 5% in the 
Tenth Circuit. 
 154 We used the index for citizen ideology developed by William D. Berry et al. See 
William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 
1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 327–48 (1998). See generally Richard C. Fording, State 
Ideology Data, WORDPRESS (June 18, 2018), https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-
ideology-data/ [https://perma.cc/FBT7-UCJ8]. The citizen ideology index was used to 
categorize states into three categories: (1) Republican states (<45), (2) centrist states (45> 
and <55), and (3) Democratic states (>55). The index for each state was averaged over the 
years 2001–2016 to cover the period of the two studies. 
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Figure 1: NEPA District Court Cases by Circuit 
           
 
Figure 2: ESA District Court Cases by Circuit 
 
 
The pattern of litigation observed was not preordained by the geographic 
distribution of the underlying actions. NEPA requires an EIS for any federal 
action that has “significant” environmental impacts,155 and while one would 
anticipate some geographic variation, there is no reason to expect that the cases 
would be so disproportionately concentrated in these circuits, particularly given 
                                                                                                                     
 155 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
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population and development patterns nationally. Yet, EPA data reveal that 
roughly 47% of the EISs, the most rigorous level of environmental review 
engaged in by agencies, prepared from 2012 through 2016 involved actions that 
were located in the Ninth Circuit.156 Similarly, under the ESA, while informal 
consultations were evenly distributed across the country, with no circuit 
containing more than about 15% of the consultations,157 60% of formal 
consultations from 2008 through 2016 involved actions based in the Ninth 
Circuit.158 Accordingly, we find that although the universe of actions subject to 
the statutes is disbursed widely across the country, federal litigation was located 
disproportionately in the Ninth Circuit. 
The reasons for the uneven distribution of cases likely reflect a mix of 
strategic and structural factors. In the case of the D.C. Circuit,159 the location of 
most federal agencies in D.C. affords plaintiffs the option of selecting it as an 
alternative venue in most cases; in essence, plaintiffs can use it as an option for 
forum shopping.160 The large number of cases in the Ninth Circuit is driven, in 
part, by the nature of the cases—most of which involve federal lands, which are 
heavily concentrated in the states encompassed by the Ninth Circuit.161 Forum 
shopping is also a potential factor for the Ninth Circuit, particularly given, as 
discussed further below, that plaintiffs prevailed at higher rates in the Ninth 
Circuit. This explanation has an inherent limit, however, because only about 
20% of the NEPA and ESA cases in district court involved actions that spanned 
more than one circuit.162 Thus, the number of cases in which forum shopping 
could arise falls short of accounting for the number of cases in the Ninth Circuit. 
Inter-circuit disparities in plaintiffs’ success rates could still operate as a 
                                                                                                                     
 156 Adelman & Glicksman, Citizen Suits, supra note 148, at 408. 
 157 Id. 
 158 For the difference between informal and formal consultations, see 3 GEORGE C. 
COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §§ 29:26–27 (2d ed. 
2007). Informal consultation “is an optional process that includes all discussions, 
correspondence, etc., between the Service and the Federal agency or the designated non-
Federal representative, designed to assist the Federal agency in determining whether formal 
consultation or a conference is required.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a) (2017). Formal consultation 
is required if an agency determines that its action may affect listed species or critical habitat. 
Id. § 402.14(a). 
 159 Under NEPA, the D.C. Circuit cases involved challenged activities that were located 
in 11 circuits, with the highest number of cases originating from the Fourth Circuit (4), Sixth 
Circuit (4), Tenth Circuit (5), and Eleventh Circuit (3). 
 160 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) (2012) (providing that a civil action in which a defendant 
is the United States, a federal agency, or an official of such an agency may be brought in any 
judicial district in which a defendant in the action resides). 
 161 Most federal land is located in western states, suggesting that one would expect cases 
to be filed disproportionately in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which together encompass 
99% of land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 85% of U.S. Forest 
Service (USFS) land, and 91% of land under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service 
(NPS). See Adelman & Glicksman, Judicial Politics, supra note 147, at 31. 
 162 Just 12% of the NEPA cases and roughly 17% of the ESA cases spanned more than 
one circuit. 
2020] JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY AS A CHECK ON EXECUTIVE POWER 203 
deterrent to filing cases in other federal circuits. If this were a significant factor, 
it could depress the number of cases outside the Ninth Circuit and contribute to 
the skewed distribution of cases geographically.  
The analysis that follows utilizes a variety of statistical methods to assess 
the relative influence of local, executive, and judicial politics on case outcomes 
and the geographic distribution of the cases. Starting with basic descriptive 
statistics, we find substantial differences in outcomes between cases filed during 
the Bush Administration and those filed during the Obama Administration. 
Environmental plaintiffs in NEPA cases were about twice as likely to prevail in 
district and appellate courts during the Bush Administration as during the 
Obama Administration.163 The differences were smaller in the ESA cases, 
though, with environmental plaintiffs about 50% more likely to prevail during 
the Bush Administration at both the district and appellate court levels.164 In 
absolute terms, the cross-administration differences were nineteen and fourteen 
percentage points for NEPA and ESA cases, respectively.  
Geographically, the Ninth Circuit was not only the center of activity, it was 
also a favorable venue for plaintiffs. In the Ninth Circuit, environmental 
plaintiffs prevailed at the district court level in NEPA and ESA cases at rates 
ten to twenty-five percentage points higher than other circuits (collectively).165 
The D.C. Circuit was a somewhat less favorable venue, with rates that were 
about ten percentage points lower than those in the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit stood out during the Bush Administration, with environmental 
plaintiffs advantaged in ESA and NEPA cases by fifteen and thirty percentage 
points, respectively. However, while this advantage persisted for the ESA cases, 
it largely disappeared for NEPA cases during the Obama Administration.166 
These findings reveal that district judges in the Ninth Circuit were consistently 
less deferential to agencies than their counterparts in other circuits, whereas 
Ninth Circuit appellate judges were less deferential in ESA cases across both 
                                                                                                                     
 163 Environmental plaintiffs won 42% of the district court NEPA cases during the Bush 
Administration versus 23% of the district court cases during the Obama Administration; at 
the appellate level, plaintiffs won 36% of the NEPA cases during the Bush Administration 
versus 17% of the cases during the Obama Administration. 
 164 Under the ESA, plaintiffs won 47% of the district court ESA cases during the Bush 
Administration versus 32% of the district court cases during the Obama Administration; at 
the appellate level, plaintiffs won 34% of the ESA cases during the Bush Administration 
versus 22% of the cases during the Obama Administration. 
 165 Under NEPA, environmental plaintiffs won 50% of the district court cases in the 
Ninth Circuit, 42% in the D.C. Circuit, and 25% in other circuits during the Bush 
Administration; these rates dropped to 28%, 21%, and 6%, respectively, during the Obama 
Administration. Under the ESA, environmental plaintiffs won 52% of the district court cases 
in the Ninth Circuit, 42% in the D.C. Circuit, and 29% in other circuits during the Bush 
Administration; these rates dropped to 28%, 21%, and 6%, respectively, during the Obama 
Administration. 
 166 Environmental plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit during the Obama Administration 
prevailed in 19% of the NEPA cases versus 14% in all other circuits collectively; for ESA 
cases, plaintiff success rates were 27% and 11%, respectively.  
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administrations but in NEPA cases they were less deferential only during the 
Bush Administration.  
The influence of judicial ideology on case outcomes was more nuanced and 
less pronounced than the impact of the circuit and presidential politics. At the 
district court level, plaintiffs’ success rates were roughly fifteen percentage 
points higher before Democratic-appointed judges than Republican-appointed 
judges in cases filed during the Bush Administration;167 however, the 
differential dropped to about ten percentage points during the Obama 
Administration and was no longer statistically significant.168 This result 
suggests that the influence of judicial ideology declined with the shift in 
presidential politics—it was statistically significant when the conservative 
ideology of the Bush Administration conflicted with the liberal statutory 
mandates of NEPA and the ESA but was neutralized when the priorities of the 
Obama Administration were largely in alignment with those of the statutes. 
At the appellate level, the influence of judicial ideology was complicated 
by the permutations of three-judge panels. Consistent with studies discussed 
above,169 we observed the greatest differences in case outcomes between the 
two administrations when panels were ideologically uniform, either all 
Republican or all Democratic appointees, whereas ideologically mixed panels 
tended to moderate plaintiffs’ success rates.170 During the Bush Administration, 
environmental plaintiffs prevailed before all-Democratic panels at rates that 
were about fifty percentage points above those before all-Republican panels.171 
However, the impact of judicial ideology diminished during the Obama 
Administration, with plaintiffs’ success rates in NEPA and ESA cases dropping 
overall and disparities across panels with different ideological mixes generally 
declining to ten to fifteen percentage points.172 While we cannot know whether 
                                                                                                                     
 167 For the NEPA cases, plaintiffs prevailed before Republican and Democratic judges 
in 31% and 44% of the cases (p-value of 0.046), respectively; for ESA cases, plaintiffs 
prevailed before Republican and Democratic judges in 33% and 51% of the cases (p-value 
of 0.003), respectively. 
 168 For the NEPA cases, plaintiffs prevailed before Republican and Democratic judges 
in 16% and 23% of the cases (p-value 0.265), respectively; for ESA cases, plaintiffs 
prevailed before Republican and Democratic judges in 27% and 39% of the cases (p-value 
of 0.071), respectively. 
 169 See supra Part II.A. 
 170 The one exception was NEPA cases with majority-Democratic panels during the 
Bush Administration, before which plaintiffs prevailed at modestly higher rates than all-
Democratic panels (53% versus 47%, respectively). 
 171 For the NEPA appeals during the Bush Administration, plaintiffs prevailed 0% of the 
time before an all-Republican panel versus 48% before all-Democratic panels; for ESA 
appeals, plaintiffs prevailed 20% of the time before an all-Republican panel versus 73% 
before all-Democratic panels. The p-values were all below 5% with the exception of ESA 
cases during the Obama Administration. 
 172 The one exception was plaintiff success rates before all-Democratic panels in NEPA 
cases, which remained static around 50%. By contrast, while the rate for all-Democratic 
panels in ESA cases remained relatively high, it fell by more than half and was not 
statistically significant. 
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the long-term baselines for plaintiffs’ success rates under either statute are closer 
to the level observed during the Bush or Obama Administrations,173 the 
observed declines in the influence of judicial ideology on politically uniform 
panels is striking. 
We believe that the interplay we observe between judicial and presidential 
politics is likely generalizable to statutes that reflect conservative values (e.g., 
immigration, regulatory reform, school choice); however, for such conservative 
statutes, the influence of ideology on judicial review would decline during 
Republican administrations. We find evidence for this in the trends we observe 
across the two administrations. Specifically, the pattern for the influence of 
judicial ideology is inverted for cases filed by plaintiffs other than 
environmental organizations and it is Republican judges who favor them. In 
most of these cases, the plaintiffs are private entities (often landowners) or local 
governments seeking to weaken or avoid regulations under the ESA. Although 
the number of cases is much smaller (thirty-six appellate cases), the success rate 
of non-environmental plaintiffs before Republican-majority appellate panels 
doubled between the Bush and Obama administrations, from 23% to 44%, 
whereas it was essentially flat before Democratic-majority panels.174 A similar 
pattern is observed in the district court cases, with non-environmental plaintiffs 
prevailing at double the rate before Republican judges during the Obama 
Administration (24% versus 48%), while their success before Democratic 
judges remained the same. The small number of cases, particularly at the 
appellate level, limits the inferences that we can draw from the data, but these 
findings are nevertheless consistent with either conservative or liberal 
presidential politics impacting the degree to which ideology is a significant 
factor during judicial review of agency action. 
B. The Relative Importance of Institutional and Political Factors  
We conducted multiple regressions using the district and appellate court 
data.175 Table 1 below displays the results from four logistic regressions using 
                                                                                                                     
 173 At least one earlier study suggests that the average is closer to rates observed during 
the Obama Administration. Robert W. Malmsheimer et al., National Forest Litigation in the 
US Courts of Appeals, 102 J. FORESTRY 20, 22 (2004) (finding that the USFS prevailed in 
64% of the ESA cases during the George H.W. Bush Administration and 80% of the cases 
during the first Clinton Administration). 
 174 During the Bush Administration, non-environmental plaintiffs won three out of 
thirteen cases before majority-Republican panels versus zero of five before majority-
Democratic panels; during the Obama Administration, non-environmental plaintiffs won 
four out of nine cases before majority-Republican panels versus one of eight before majority-
Democratic panels. 
 175 Because the dependent variable—whether the plaintiff prevailed on at least one of its 
claims—was categorical, logistic regression was used in place of conventional ordinary-
least-squares regression. ALAN C. ACOCK, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO STATA 302–04 (rev. 
3d ed. 2012). This type of regression generates a “likelihood” or “odds” ratio, which in our 
analysis is simply the ratio of the likelihood of a plaintiff prevailing when the value of the 
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two variations on parameters for each statute to assess the influence of key 
variables relative to each other. The dependent variable in each regression is 
case outcome, where success was defined as a plaintiff prevailing on at least one 
of either the NEPA or ESA claims. Likelihood ratios for plaintiff success rates 
appear above the z-values,176 which are in brackets, and the asterisks indicate 
the degree of statistical significance for each parameter. We conducted 
regressions with interaction terms to test whether the variables operated 
independently. None of the interaction terms were found to be statistically 
significant. 
1. The Principal Predictors of Case Outcomes 
The results in Table 1 confirm that the Ninth Circuit,177 judicial ideology, 
and class of plaintiff, specifically environmental organizations, have a 
statistically significant impact on the outcomes of ESA and NEPA cases in 
district court.178 Plaintiffs were 1.7–1.8 times more likely to succeed in an ESA 
or NEPA case before a Democratic judge than a Republican judge; they were 
roughly 1.7–2.5 times more likely to succeed in the Ninth Circuit; and plaintiffs 
were 1.5–2.5 times more likely to prevail if they were a national environmental 
organization.179 The statistical significance of the circuit variable implies that 
inter-circuit differences cannot be reduced to the ideology of judges. Structural 
features of the circuits must also be factors, particularly the balance of 
Republican and Democratic district court judges in the circuit, and whether the 
                                                                                                                     
applicable dummy variable is “one” over the likelihood when it is “zero.” Id. For example, 
the dummy variable for presidential administration in our analysis designates the Bush 
Administration as “0” and the Obama Administration as “1.” Accordingly, the likelihood 
ratio is the odds of a plaintiff winning its case during the Obama Administration over the 
odds of a plaintiff prevailing during the Bush Administration. In this case, a likelihood ratio 
of “0.5” implies that a plaintiff has a 50 percent lower chance of winning an ESA suit during 
the Obama Administration than during the Bush Administration; conversely, a likelihood 
ratio of “1.5” implies that a plaintiff has a 50% greater chance of prevailing during the 
Obama Administration. 
 176 A “z-value” is a complementary measure of statistical significance that indicates the 
number of standard deviations the observed data deviate from the value predicted by the 
statistical model. Z-Score: Definition, Formula and Calculation, STATISTICS HOW TO, 
https://www.statisticshowto.datasciencecentral.com/probability-and-statistics/z-score 
[https://perma.cc/76M8-975A]. 
 177 The statistical significance of the coefficient for the D.C. Circuit may have been 
limited by statistical power. Only sixty cases were filed in the D.C. Circuit, which, while 
large relative to most circuits, was small for purposes of statistical power—for our data, the 
statistical power was less than sixty for any sample with fewer than ninety-four cases. 
 178 The dummy variable, designating whether or not a case was published, was included 
as a control variable. 
 179 The success rates of environmental plaintiffs diverged somewhat across 
administrations—national environmental organizations had higher success rates than local 
ones (53% versus 40% percent, respectively) during the Bush Administration, but they 
converged during the Obama Administration (25% and 21%, respectively). 
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politics of “Republican” and “Democratic” judges differ across circuits (i.e., a 
Republican judge in the Ninth Circuit may not be as conservative as one in the 
Fifth Circuit). For NEPA cases alone, environmental plaintiffs were about 2.7 
times more likely to prevail during the Bush administration and two times more 
likely to prevail if they were a local environmental organization. Other potential 
factors, such as the identity of the defendant federal agency, were also evaluated 
but found not to be statistically significant. 
The regressions for the appellate cases appear in Table 2 below.180 The 
dependent variable in each regression is again case outcome, with success 
defined as a plaintiff prevailing on at least one of its NEPA or ESA claims. The 
other statistics in Table 2 mirror those of Table 1 apart from judicial ideology, 
which treats the four ideological combinations of three judges separately using 
panels with two Republican judges and one Democratic judge as the baseline 
against which the other panels were measured. An ideologically mixed panel 
was chosen as the baseline on the premise that it reflects a relatively neutral 
position ideologically. With regard to other ESA and NEPA claims, the smaller 
sample sizes of our appellate databases and the low rates at which most claims 
were raised limited the statistical power of our analysis. 
 
Table 1: Logistic Regression for District Court Case Outcomes 
 NEPA NEPA ESA ESA 
 Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling 
     
Administration 0.374*** 0.362*** 0.786 0.788 
 (-4.34) (-4.53) (-1.25) (-1.24) 
     
Appointing     1.809** 1.851** 1.760** 1.776** 
President’s (2.64) (2.76) (2.91) (2.98) 
Party for Judge     
     
DC Circuit 1.620 1.757 0.613 0.615 
 (1.26) (1.49) (-1.43) (-1.43) 
     
Ninth Circuit 2.607*** 2.468*** 1.728* 1.745* 
 (3.51) (3.37) (2.33) (2.38) 
     
National  2.476** 2.539** 1.580 1.481* 
Environmental (2.93) (3.02) (1.78) (2.04) 
Organization     
     
                                                                                                                     
 180 We conducted multiple regressions on specific claims under the ESA and NEPA; 
only a single claim under NEPA, whether an agency took a “hard look” at the environmental 
impacts of a federal action, was statistically significant. However, judges may have used the 
hard look review in a generic manner that raises questions of endogeneity—in other words, 
judges convinced on independent technical grounds that the agency’s analysis was adequate 
often ended their opinion by concluding that the agency had undertaken the required hard 
look. 
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Local  1.945* 1.972* 1.106  
Environmental (2.36) (2.42) (0.38)  
Organization     
     
ESA  
Listing  
  2.486** 2.474** 
Petition   (3.00) (2.99) 
     
Case Published 1.375  1.766** 1.765** 
 (1.35)  (2.82) (2.81) 
N 462 462 521 521 
Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
 
The regression coefficients in Table 2 are roughly consistent across the ESA 
and NEPA cases for the presidential administration, whether the defendant 
(typically the government) was an appellee, and all-Democratic appellate 
panels.181 On average, plaintiffs were about twice as likely to prevail during the 
Bush Administration, and they were two to four times more likely to prevail in 
cases before all-Democratic panels than panels with two Republican judges and 
one Democratic judge. The identity of the appellee, whether it was a defendant 
or plaintiff, was also a significant factor despite the small number of appeals 
initiated by defendants (fewer than twenty-five cases under either statute); 
defendants were about four times more likely to prevail on appeal than plaintiffs. 
For the NEPA cases, the Ninth Circuit and environmental plaintiffs were each 
statistically significant factors. Plaintiffs were roughly 2.5 times more likely to 
win in the Ninth Circuit, and environmental plaintiffs were about two times 
more likely to prevail than other classes of plaintiffs. 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression for Appeals Outcome 
 NEPA NEPA ESA ESA 
 Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling 
     
Other Circuits- 2.294** 2.757*** 0.751 0.740 
Ninth Circuit (2.43) (3.25) (-0.63) (-0.67) 
     
Administration182 0.537
** 0.572* 0.462* 0.500* 
                                                                                                                     
 181 While the statistical significance is weaker under the ESA, this is likely due to the 
smaller number of cases. Given that our sample of NEPA cases includes over 340 cases and 
is almost equally divided between the Bush and Obama Administrations, statistical power is 
unlikely to be a problem. 
 182 The time lag associated with appeals makes it more difficult to define when one 
administration stops and another begins. We experimented with different cutoff dates, but 
the results did not vary significantly. As a consequence, we adopted a “middle of the road” 
approach that defines the Bush Administration as encompassing all circuit cases filed 
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 (-2.06) (-1.89) (-1.85) (-1.70) 
 
 
    
Case  2.646** 2.611** 1.243 1.269 
Published183 (2.56) (2.56) (0.37) (0.41) 
     
Hard Look 0.448** 0.442**   
 (-2.33) (-2.43)   
     
Appellee 0.219*** 0.223*** 0.218*** 0.257** 
 (-2.81) (-2.94) (-2.78) (-2.54) 
     
Environmental 2.094** 2.032** 1.905  
Organization (2.21) (2.17) (1.51)  
     
Circuit Panel 0.770  1.483 1.408 
3-Reps (-0.43)  (0.58) (0.51) 
     
Circuit Panel 1.291  1.334 1.363 
1-Rep/2-Dems (0.70)  (0.37) (0.40) 
     
Circuit Panel 2.247*  4.157* 4.146** 
3-Dems (1.86)  (1.94) (1.97) 
     
N 330 334 158 158 
Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
 
2. Presidential Politics and Plaintiff Success Rates 
The results of the regressions for the appellate cases differ both across the 
two statutes and with those for district courts. Case outcomes under both statutes 
were influenced by the presidential administration, which was associated with a 
decrease in success rates of about twenty percentage points between the Bush 
and Obama Administrations. This result could be driven by multiple factors, 
including changes in the cases plaintiffs filed or the policies of the presidential 
                                                                                                                     
between 2002 and 2009, and the Obama Administration as encompassing all cases filed 
between 2010 and 2015. 
 183 Whether the case was published is a control variable, but it does not change the 
results significantly if it is excluded. The principal impact is on the Ninth Circuit variable 
for NEPA cases, which falls below statistical significance if publication is removed. The 
coefficients for other independent variables change only modestly. 
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administration. Given the Bush Administration’s deregulatory bias,184 a 
plausible explanation is that the Bush Administration’s compliance with the 
statutes was weak and that this caused appellate judges to rule in favor of 
plaintiffs more often—correcting instances in which district court judges were 
overly deferential. It is notable that plaintiffs’ success rate on appeal was not 
affected by their high success rates in district court (and the resulting smaller 
pool of cases) during the Bush Administration—they won at higher rates in both 
district and appellate court. Thus, even though district court judges ruled in 
favor of plaintiffs at greater rates, the pool of cases for appeal was, on average, 
stronger during the Bush Administration than during the Obama Administration. 
While we cannot definitively distinguish between the potential factors at work, 
we believe that the high success rates of plaintiffs in district court and on appeal 
suggests strongly that administration policies and implementation were central 
factors.  
Our reasoning turns on the inference that plaintiffs were not more selective 
in the cases they appealed during the Bush Administration, which is premised 
on three observations. First, the number of appeals filed annually was 
comparable during the two administrations, despite plaintiffs’ success rate in 
district court during the Bush Administration being higher than it was during 
the Obama Administration. Second, the threshold for choosing a case to appeal 
was quite high (only about a quarter of NEPA and a third of ESA cases were 
appealed), which substantially narrowed the range of cases.185 This selectivity 
would tend to diminish the differences observed in appellate outcomes across 
administrations assuming plaintiffs were effective in selecting cases with a 
                                                                                                                     
 184 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. 
& ADMIN. L. 285, 329 (2013) (“In general, the GW Bush administration’s midnight 
regulations reflected what one would expect based on the policies of the administration, 
deregulating in the environmental area and regulating labor unions and abortion providers 
more strictly.”); Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1355, 1363 (2009) (“To the chagrin of public interest groups and the joy of industry-
funded think tanks, OIRA greatly stemmed the flow of health, safety and environmental 
regulation during the Bush Administration.”); Max R. Sarinsky, Discount Double-Check: An 
Analysis of the Discount Rate for Calculating the Social Cost of Carbon, 19 N.Y.U.  J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 215, 243 (2016) (discussing “attempts by the George W. Bush administration 
to weaken environmental regulation based on politically motivated intervention in cost-
benefit analysis”). 
 185 In essence, the more selective plaintiffs are in determining which cases to appeal, the 
narrower the range will be with regard to the strength of their claims. Their efficacy in this 
respect will depend on how proficient plaintiffs are at selecting stronger cases—and focused 
on this as a criterion. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New 
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337–38 (1990) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Selection Effect]; Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, Why Do 
Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?, 15 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 73, 105 (2013); John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and 
Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation, 21 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 501, 503–04 
(2005). 
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higher likelihood of winning.186 Third, if selection criteria did vary, one would 
expect environmental plaintiffs to be less selective—that is more aggressive—
during the Bush Administration. But, contrary to our results, such a strategy 
would lead to lower, rather than higher, success rates in court. The higher 
success rates of plaintiffs during the Bush Administration therefore appear more 
likely to be attributable to shifts in administration policies and implementation 
rather than the litigation strategies of environmental plaintiffs. 
3. Appellate Panels Effects and Circuit Structure 
The other major factor that was common to both statutes was judicial 
ideology, but its impacts were statistically significant only for all-Democratic 
panels. As noted above, the role of ideology on three-judge panels is mediated 
by the strong norm of unanimity that exists among circuit judges.187 This norm 
reduces the influence of judicial ideology on mixed panels, which predominate 
in circuits with relatively balanced numbers of judges based on political 
affiliation. This theory is consistent with the small, statistically insignificant 
differences we observe in the coefficients for ideologically mixed panels.188 
Unlike prior studies, however, we find that the coefficient for panels with all-
Republican judges did not differ meaningfully from the ideologically mixed 
panels, whereas the coefficients for all-Democratic panels were higher by a 
factor of two to four.189 This asymmetry is the opposite of what Revesz observed 
in his study of D.C. Circuit cases, where he found that all-Republican panels 
were the most extreme ideologically.190 For the third common factor, whether 
                                                                                                                     
 186 Eisenberg, Selection Effect, supra note 185, at 338 n.3 (affirming the importance of 
selection effects on appeal). 
 187 This norm is clearly evident in our sample data: dissents were filed in just 5.5% of 
the cases. See Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals: Minority Representation under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 
307 (2004) (observing that the norm of consensus among appellate judges stems from “a 
view among judges that unanimous court opinions promote the appearance of legal 
objectivity, certainty, and neutrality, which fosters courts’ institutional legitimacy”); see also 
Renee Cohn Jubelirer, Communicating Disagreement Behind the Bench: The Importance of 
Rules and Norms of an Appellate Court, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 105–06 (2019) 
(contrasting collegial deliberative and adversarial collaborative processes of judicial 
decision-making). 
 188 The baseline for the regression is a panel with two Republican-appointed judges and 
one Democratic. The results in Table 2 show that the increase in plaintiff success rate above 
this baseline for a panel with two Democratic-appointed judges and one Republican is less 
than 30% and that it is not statistically significant. 
 189 See supra Table 2. Statistical power was likely a factor for the NEPA cases, given 
the small number of appeals with all-Republican panels. Because of the adverse 
combinatorics, uniform panels were relatively rare in our sample, representing thirty-seven 
and fifty-two cases for the all Republican-appointed and all Democratic-appointed panels, 
respectively. 
 190 See Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1754 tbl.11. While the coefficient in supra 
Table 2 regression is not statistically significant at the 5% level, a much larger study would 
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the government was an appellee, the small number of defendant-initiated 
appeals limits what we can infer—beyond that appellate judges appear to be 
especially deferential to government agencies when they initiate an appeal. 
The results for NEPA cases exhibit two additional statistically significant 
factors at the appellate level—whether the case was filed in the Ninth Circuit 
and whether the plaintiff was an environmental organization. The persistence of 
circuit effects for appeals of NEPA cases is likely attributable, in part, to the 
large share (more than 50%) of the cases in the Ninth Circuit, which is important 
because the number of cases heard by ideologically uniform three-judge panels 
scales nonlinearly with the number of cases in a circuit.191 In the Ninth Circuit, 
this effect was reinforced by the roughly 60%–40% split between Republican 
and Democratic circuit judges.192 Accordingly, 65% of the NEPA appeals 
nationally were decided by majority-Democratic panels, and 83% of those with 
all-Democratic panels were Ninth Circuit cases.193 Thus, rudimentary statistics 
effectively amplified the disparity in NEPA case outcomes between the Ninth 
Circuit and other circuits collectively. The second factor, the equal or higher 
success rates of environmental plaintiffs on appeal, underscores the relative 
merits of their claims, as they prevailed at higher rates than other plaintiffs 
before both Democratic and Republican judges. 
It is notable that the Ninth Circuit is a favorable venue for ESA cases at the 
district court level but not on appeal.194 This could simply be a matter of 
selection effects and the smaller number of ESA cases relative to those filed 
under NEPA. Since so few ESA cases were appealed, the high threshold for 
pursuing an appeal may have dampened any cross-circuit differences. The 
relatively small number of cases may also have resulted in somewhat 
idiosyncratic distributions of cases. For example, the principal difference 
between the two statutes appears to be with panels having two Democratic 
                                                                                                                     
have to be conducted to achieve the necessary statistical power given that fifteen years of 
data produced just fifty-two cases with all Democratic-appointed panels. However, the 
sample size, which represents roughly two-thirds of the 2001–2016 appeals, gives us 
sufficient confidence to treat the coefficient as meaningful and not a statistical fluke. 
 191 See supra Figure 1. By contrast, the small number of ESA cases heard in most circuits 
(typically less than one case per year) reduces the probability of having more than a couple 
of ideologically uniform panels to essentially zero. 
 192 In our full sample, 49% of the judges were appointed by Democratic presidents and 
51% were appointed by Republican presidents. The split in the D.C. Circuit was close to the 
national average—47% versus 53% for Democrat- and Republican-appointed judges, 
respectively; however, the split in the Tenth Circuit was 41% versus 59% for Democrat- and 
Republican-appointed judges, respectively. 
 193 Similarly, within the Ninth Circuit, 73% of the ESA appeals were heard by majority 
Democrat-appointee panels and 25% were heard by all Democrat-appointee panels (roughly 
double the rate, on average, if there were equal numbers of Democratic- and Republican-
appointed judges). By contrast, only a single appeal was heard by an all Democratic-
appointed panel in the D.C., Tenth, or Sixth Circuits, which were the only other circuits with 
more than fifteen cases in our sample. 
 194 See supra Tables 1 & 2. 
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judges and one Republican judge, which for ESA cases in the Ninth Circuit 
ruled against plaintiffs at a rate higher than panels on which Republicans were 
in the majority.195 Two factors may be at play here: (1) a disproportionate share 
of the Republican-majority panels heard cases during the Bush Administration, 
which could raise plaintiffs’ success rates in relative terms; and (2) while 
majority-Democratic panels were evenly distributed over time, panels with two 
Democrats were highly deferential to the Obama Administration, which 
prevailed in 94% of the cases. This speculative analysis illustrates the inherent 
indeterminacies created by the interplay of case selection effects, judicial 
panels, and the volume of cases. Resolving these effects is not always feasible; 
instead, the clearest inferences we can draw center on the relative importance of 
the statistically significant factors found in the regressions. 
4. Judicial Ideology and Case Outcomes 
The regression results make it clear that judicial ideology is not a 
predominant factor in case outcomes; while it is consistently a factor, the 
administration, the Ninth Circuit, and the class of plaintiff are often of 
comparable or substantially greater importance. In the district courts, we find 
that the influence of judicial politics, the Ninth Circuit, and the plaintiff are 
comparable for ESA cases and that the Ninth Circuit, presidential 
administration, and plaintiff have significantly greater influence than judicial 
ideology for NEPA cases.196 On appeal, judicial ideology is a significant factor 
only for all-Democratic panels, which account for a small proportion of the 
cases under either statute.197 For NEPA appeals, the ideological influence of all-
Democratic panels is comparable to the influence of the administration, the 
Ninth Circuit, and the plaintiff.198 By contrast, the influence of ideology on all-
Democratic panels in ESA cases was roughly double that of the presidential 
administration, which was the only other statistically and practically significant 
factor.199 Accordingly, judicial ideology is one of several factors in district court 
and, while still significant and even dominant in magnitude on appeal, its 
influence is discernable in a relatively small number of cases. Overall, judicial 
ideology is observed to impact more district court than appellate cases, but its 
influence is substantially smaller, on average, than in the subset of appeals with 
ideologically uniform panels. 
More concretely, if we assume that the “ideologically neutral” rate for 
overturning agency decisions during the study period was midway between the 
rates observed for Democratic and Republican district court judges, roughly ten 
                                                                                                                     
 195 By contrast, in the NEPA cases, such panels in the Ninth Circuit decided in favor of 
plaintiffs at rates just slightly lower than all-Democratic panels, whereas such panels in other 
circuits ruled at rates that were comparable to those of Republican-majority panels. 
 196 See supra Table 1. 
 197 See supra Table 2. 
 198 See id. 
 199 See id. 
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NEPA and four ESA cases were wrongly decided annually, with the cases 
evenly divided between those overly deferential and those second guessing the 
agency. At the appellate level, the numbers would be about two and one 
annually for NEPA and ESA appeals, respectively, assuming that the 
ideologically mixed panels represent the ideologically neutral position. These 
estimates lead to “departure rates” from nominally neutral adjudication of 10%–
13% in district court cases and 3%–5% on appeal. These departure rates are 
useful proxies for estimating the number of cases that were decided on 
ideological grounds rather than on an admittedly idealized, neutral, or balanced 
legal basis. Whether expressed in absolute or relative terms, the departures from 
neutrality are modest, particularly given the imprecision of the statutory 
provisions and applicable legal doctrines on judicial review. Moreover, many of 
the ESA and all of the NEPA cases involved procedural issues for which judicial 
deference is likely to be low and thus the potential for ideological distortions 
would be higher than the average administrative review cases.200 The final 
section explores potential explanations for the trends we observe and assesses 
their practical and normative implications. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS THAT MEDIATE POLITICS IN THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The study results show that the influence of judicial ideology on case 
outcomes is mediated by two principal factors in addition to randomized 
selection of judges. The structure of circuits impacts the volume of cases in each 
circuit, which at the district court level can alter the balance of Republican and 
Democratic judges that hear cases and at the appellate level can affect the 
number of ideologically uniform panels. Presidential policies create alignments 
and misalignments between judicial ideology, statutory mandates, and the 
executive branch, which cause the politics of judges to figure more or less 
prominently in legal opinions.201 We believe that identifying the conditions that 
moderate or exacerbate the influence of judicial ideology is critical to the 
legitimacy of judicial review. Our analysis of the NEPA and ESA cases 
indicates that concerns about judicial ideology at the district and appellate court 
levels tend to be overstated and that the escalating battles over judicial 
appointments appear to be out of step with reality. In most circumstances, 
judicial ideology plays a secondary role. Outside the Supreme Court, where a 
single appointment has the potential to flip the ideological balance of the Court, 
the politicization of judicial appointments has had limited effect.202 If a single 
President is able to fill an unusually high number of lower court vacancies, as 
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 202 U.S. COURTS, JUDGESHIP APPOINTMENTS BY PRESIDENT (2019), https://www.us 
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President Trump has been able to do during the first three years of his 
presidency, politicization becomes more of a threat. Understanding the 
institutional mechanisms that mediate the influence of judicial ideology and 
their vulnerabilities to being undermined or overridden is of critical importance 
to integrity of the legal system. 
Our central finding is that presidential politics, the class of plaintiff, and the 
filing of a case in the Ninth Circuit frequently have a greater impact on case 
outcomes than judicial ideology. While we cannot definitively determine the 
reasons each of these factors affects case outcomes, we identify the most likely 
explanations. In the case of environmental plaintiffs, Republican judges are 
unlikely to be particularly sympathetic to their claims, and yet environmental 
groups prevail at higher rates before judges of either political affiliation.203 We 
suggest that careful case selection, driven by resource constraints, is the most 
likely reason for these groups’ higher success rates, which is consistent with the 
low frequency of litigation relative to the number of federal actions that could 
be challenged. Similarly, the higher success rates of environmental plaintiffs 
during the Bush Administration is most likely attributable to weaker agency 
compliance with the statutes, as opposed to greater selectivity in challenging 
agency actions or less aggressive litigation tactics. By contrast, the unique status 
of the Ninth Circuit is driven by circumstantial and structural factors—the high 
volume of cases, the balance of Republican and Democratic judges, and 
systemic differences in the politics of Republican and Democratic judges across 
circuits. Importantly, while the high threshold that must be cleared before 
environmental plaintiffs are willing to sue likely diminishes the potential 
influence of judicial ideology, the divergent policies of the two administrations 
and the large volume of cases in the Ninth Circuit provide statistical variance 
and power, respectively, that make it easier to discern the effects of the 
mediating institutional mechanisms in the federal judicial system. 
This part of the Article incorporates and expands upon the literature on the 
impact that judges’ politics have on judicial review. Most importantly, we 
consider institutional mechanisms that mediate the influence of judicial 
ideology beyond randomly selected three-judge appellate panels. While our 
empirical results for appellate cases are consistent with prior studies of judicial 
ideology, the mediating impact of circuit geography and the degree of alignment 
between presidential policies and statutory objectives also play an important 
role in mediating the influence of judicial ideology. Our study of district court 
cases also extends the existing studies, which have focused almost exclusively 
on the appellate courts. We begin with a discussion of how the different 
dynamics of trial and appellate court litigation reduce the impact of judicial 
ideology in the district courts. We then turn to evaluating the capacity of judicial 
review to moderate the influence of presidential politics by invalidating agency 
decisions in tension with statutory goals, and to the manner in which geographic 
                                                                                                                     
 203 See supra Tables 1 & 2. 
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and ideological inter-circuit differences drive case outcomes. The final section 
focuses on the normative and practical implications of our findings. 
A. Institutional Constraints on the Influence of Judicial Ideology 
The structural differences and hierarchical relationship between district and 
appellate courts each impacts the influence of judicial ideology on case 
outcomes. Most importantly, district court cases are not subject to the mediating 
effect of three-judge panels.204 Reliance on a single judge results in judicial 
ideology being a persistent factor in district court opinions, but its influence 
appears to be tempered by the low political salience of most cases.205 District 
court cases, due to the heightened selectivity of appeals, are typically lower 
stakes and raise legal issues that are less contentious or problematic than the 
average case that is appealed.206 These characteristics make it less likely that 
judges’ ideological perspectives will become a significant factor, and this 
generalization is likely to be especially true for the highly technical issues often 
raised in NEPA and ESA cases. We observe this tempering effect in the modest 
influence judicial ideology has on case outcomes—about a fifteen percentage-
point difference between Republican and Democratic district court judges 
across both administrations.207 The influence of judicial ideology in district 
court opinions is further moderated by the potential for an appellate court to 
overturn district court opinions. This can occur directly, through actual appeals, 
or indirectly, through precedential opinions or the threat of an appeal. Moreover, 
the threat of a reversal on appeal is significantly greater for a district court 
decision than for a court of appeals case due to the small and dwindling number 
of cases that the Supreme Court agrees to review each year.208 Thus, the 
consistent but modest influence of judicial ideology we observe in district court 
opinions has several institutional origins. 
The influence of judicial ideology in appellate courts, as we have seen, has 
greater variance, but this variability is driven by a small subset of cases. 
Accordingly, while judicial ideology can lead to strikingly large disparities in 
the rates (often more than forty percentage points) at which plaintiffs prevail 
before ideologically uniform panels with opposing political affiliations, the 
actual number of cases implicated relative to the total appealed annually is quite 
                                                                                                                     
 204 See Fischman, Voting Patterns, supra note 13, at 820–21. 
 205 See supra Table 1. 
 206 Carney, supra note 122 (“Appeals courts, in particular, are a top priority for 
McConnell because the circuit courts hear thousands of cases every year—compared to the 
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 207 See supra Table 1. 
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small. This pattern is observed throughout the literature209 and follows from the 
institutional mechanism that drives it—the system of randomized selection of 
three-judge appellate panels. Simple combinatorics strictly bounds the number 
of ideologically uniform panels based on the numbers of Republican and 
Democratic judges in a circuit. The strong norm of unanimity among appellate 
judges, along with the relative infrequency of ideologically uniform panels, 
moderates the overall influence of ideology by tempering its influence on 
ideologically mixed panels and limiting the instances in which it is relatively 
unconstrained to a small subset of cases. We estimate that the departure rate 
from a nominally neutral position is roughly 5% and that, in absolute terms, this 
corresponds to fewer than a handful of appellate opinions annually being 
ideological outliers.210 
These constraints are contingent on there being a fair balance of Republican 
and Democratic appellate judges. A large shift in the number of judges 
appointed by one political party could disrupt this dynamic by shifting the 
balance dramatically towards judges with views that align strongly with 
Democratic or Republican politics. Conservative scholars, for example, have 
urged Congress to double or triple the number of federal appeals court and 
district court judges with the explicit goal of “undoing the judicial legacy of 
President Barack Obama.”211 Such a plan would dramatically increase the 
number of ideologically uniform panels if all or most of the vacancies were 
filled by the same president and passing a strong ideological litmus test were a 
precondition to being appointed. 
Barring such an effort, it is difficult to view modest departure rates from 
neutrality referred to above as posing a significant threat to the legitimacy of the 
federal court system. Given the indeterminacies of legal analysis and the 
imprecision of most statutory regimes, such deviations appear relatively benign. 
Some might argue that the relative differences in case outcomes are nevertheless 
troubling or, perhaps, that they are more important than the small absolute 
numbers would suggest. We recognize that the characterization of the observed 
                                                                                                                     
 209 See, e.g., Revesz, Ideology, supra note 13, at 1771–72. 
 210 “Departure rate” is used loosely here to indicate the percentage of cases in which 
plaintiffs prevailed above what would be projected if plaintiffs’ success rates before 
ideologically uniform panels were the same as those before ideologically mixed panels. 
 211 Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis 
of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), 
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also STEVEN G. CALABRESI & SHAMS HIRJI, PROPOSED JUDGESHIP BILL 1 (2017), 
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[https://perma.cc/Y8PX-FU58]; Steven G. Calabresi, Republicans Should Expand the 
Federal Courts, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/11/ 
gop-tax-bill-should-expand-federal-courts/ [https://perma.cc/LYG5-ZWNM]; Linda 
Greenhouse, Opinion, A Conservative Plan to Weaponize the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/conservatives-weaponize-
federal-courts.html [https://perma.cc/YBH6-772A]. 
218 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2 
trends in absolute or relative terms shapes how we view them. Pragmatically, 
we have emphasized the practical limits of judicial review—because perfection 
is unattainable, we should aim for a reasonable level of variance in case 
outcomes and a 5% departure rate from neutrality appears, to us at least, well 
within the bounds of reasonable expectations for complex and inherently 
discretionary judicial proceedings. 
One potential critique of this approach is that the departure rate from 
neutrality that we derive is not a conventional stochastic error rate. To the 
contrary, the large variance observed in plaintiffs’ success rates was associated 
with ideologically uniform panels, and more often panels from the Democratic 
end of the spectrum.212 Typically, the rationale that underlies acceptance of 
stochastic error rates is that it is either impossible or extremely costly to reduce 
them below a certain point.213 That is clearly not the case here, as a relatively 
low-cost option exists for reducing the variance in case outcomes observed 
across appellate panels—as several commentators have already advocated, a 
rule barring ideologically uniform panels could simply be adopted. We view this 
as a reasonable proposal if your principal objective is consistency. But as Ralph 
Waldo Emerson once observed, “[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little 
minds.”214 We believe that a risk exists here, if the tradeoffs are not adequately 
considered, of falling into a narrow focus on protecting the “rule of law” above 
all else. 
Evaluating the potential tradeoffs necessarily implicates the other 
institutional mechanisms that mediate the influence of judicial ideology. It 
therefore requires that we work through them before a full assessment of the 
tradeoffs can be conducted. Anticipating the fuller discussion below, we believe 
that the enhanced check on executive branch policies provided by ideologically 
uniform panels, in part because it is structurally bounded, has significant value 
and minimal costs given that it has a moderating effect. To the extent that it cuts 
off innovative policies, it will do so on a limited basis given the relatively low 
frequency of such panels; on the other hand, such panels are substantially more 
likely, on average, to provide an effective check on agency policies when they 
stray significantly from statutory mandates. The legally centrist asymmetric 
nature of judicial review limits the threat to “rule of law” principles while 
enhancing the potential to protect against ultra vires executive branch policies. 
B. Judicial Ideology as an Instrument of Political Moderation 
The convergence we observe in the success rates of environmental plaintiffs 
before Republican- and Democratic-majority appellate panels is a striking 
result. We interpret it as evidence that the influence of judicial ideology was 
largely neutralized in appeals during the Obama Administration. 
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Constitutionally, it reveals a mechanism by which the system of checks and 
balances adjusts to presidential policies that are in tension with statutory 
mandates. In essence, misalignment of presidential politics with a statute’s 
mandate increases the influence of ideology on case outcomes because a judge’s 
political sympathies will side either with the president or the statute. By contrast, 
when presidential politics and statutory mandates are aligned judges will be 
either indifferent, because their political sympathies favor neither the president 
nor the statute, or will be pulled in opposing directions, because their political 
sympathies are split between them. While this study centers on two 
environmental statutes, which are aligned strongly with the Democratic party, 
we believe that similar alignments and misalignments can occur with statutes 
associated with the Republican party or conservative politics. Thus, a 
Democratic administration’s implementation of a politically conservative 
statute can be expected to heighten the likelihood of a Republican judge ruling 
against the government. To our knowledge, this is the first time that the 
interaction between presidential politics and judicial ideology has been 
elucidated in this manner. 
We believe that several reasons exist for the absence of a similar 
convergence in the district court cases. First, because the influence of judicial 
ideology in the district court cases is relatively small across both 
administrations, the lower variance in case outcomes makes it harder to detect 
statistically meaningful changes.215 By contrast, we observed a large drop in the 
disparity in appellate case outcomes between panels dominated by judges with 
opposing political affiliations from roughly 34% to 5%, between majority-
Democratic and majority-Republican panels across the two administrations.216 
Moreover, essentially all of the convergence is attributable to majority-
Democratic panels; while success rates of environmental plaintiffs were 
consistently about 18% before majority-Republican panels, they dropped from 
52% to 20% before majority-Democratic panels.217 In other words, majority-
Democratic panels were much more deferential to the Obama Administration 
than the Bush Administration.218 Indeed, we observe the opposite trend for cases 
brought by non-environmental plaintiffs under the ESA, many of which directly 
challenged ESA species protections: non-environmental plaintiffs prevailed 
before majority-Republican panels at a higher rate than before majority-
                                                                                                                     
 215 In the NEPA cases, we do not observe significant differences in the success rates of 
other plaintiffs either across administrations or between majority-Democratic and majority-
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 216 See supra Part III.B. 
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both statutes. See supra Table 2. 
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Democratic panels, and this disparity increased during the Obama 
Administration.219 Although the small number of cases limits what we can infer 
from these results, the pattern inverts for non-environmental plaintiffs because 
their interests were opposed to both the principal mandate of the ESA and the 
politics of the Obama Administration. 
The alignment of interests between the judges, statutory mandates, and 
presidential politics is captured by four basic scenarios reflected in our data, 
namely, cases filed during each administration with either majority-Democratic 
or majority-Republican appellate panels.220 Starting with the Bush 
Administration, Republican judges were sympathetic to the Administration and 
unsympathetic to the liberal goals of NEPA (both factors aligning against 
environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges were sympathetic to the 
goals of NEPA but unsympathetic to the politics of the Administration (both 
factors aligning in favor of environmental plaintiffs). However, during the 
Obama Administration, Republican judges were unsympathetic to NEPA’s 
goals and to the politics of the Administration (both factors essentially neutral 
towards environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges were 
sympathetic to both (one factor favoring and the other opposing environmental 
plaintiffs). As a consequence, the ideological commitments of the judges were 
either split between the statutory mandate and the administration or neutral 
towards them, which diminished the influence of judicial ideology. 
The interaction we observe between presidential politics and judicial 
ideology likely applies beyond NEPA and the ESA. However, empirical studies 
of judicial review under other statutes, particularly those aligned ideologically 
with Republican politics, must be conducted to substantiate this claim. In 
addition, while the degree to which judicial review places a check on executive 
branch policies will be greater when the politics of a presidential administration 
diverge from the mandate of a statute, the vibrancy of that check will depend 
strongly on the balance of judges with liberal or conservative views in each 
circuit and their alignment with the mandates of the governing statute. From a 
normative perspective, our data reveal that the influence of judicial ideology is 
not per se reason for concern. To the contrary, it provides an inherently centrist 
and moderating check on executive branch policies, at least as long as judicial 
appointments are not heavily skewed toward one political party or the other. 
While we have focused on differences between majority-Democratic and 
majority-Republican panels, ideologically uniform panels, on average, tend to 
favor plaintiffs more strongly than ideologically mixed panels.221 In our study, 
                                                                                                                     
 219 During the Bush Administration, non-environmental plaintiffs won three out of 
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plaintiffs won four out of nine ESA cases (44%) before majority-Republican panels versus 
one of nine ESA cases (11%) before majority-Democratic panels. 
 220 See supra Table 2. 
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their net effect was modest because they represent a small share of the total 
number of cases. However, because the number of ideologically uniform panels 
depends nonlinearly on the number of Republican and Democratic judges, they 
could have a much greater impact if the ideological balance of federal judges 
were upset significantly. As illustrated in Figure 3 below, the percentage of 
ideologically uniform panels rises rapidly, from essentially 2% to 50% of the 
panels, as the number of judges with a Republican (or Democratic) affiliation 
rises from 20% to 80% of the population of appellate judges. Maintaining a 
relatively even balance of Republican and Democratic judges is therefore of 
critical importance for our findings to hold.222 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of All-Republican Panels versus 
Percentage of Republican Appellate Judges 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
judgment. Such decisions typically cannot push statutory policies in new directions. On the 
other hand, an all-Democratic panel that rules in favor of an environmental group’s NEPA 
challenge serves the checking function we have described above. Thus, this asymmetry 
means that judicial intervention tends to push agency decisions toward the political middle. 
There are no circumstances in which a court could reverse an agency on the ground that its 
NEPA compliance was excessive. Such cases are possible under the ESA. See, e.g., Home 
Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1211 (E.D. 
Cal. 2003) (invalidating critical habitat designation due to agency’s failure to identify 
physical or biological features that were essential to the conservation of the species). 
 222 At the same time, even in the very unlikely scenario in which 80% of the judges were 
appointed by one party, 50% of appellate panels will still include judges from each party. 
See infra Figure 3. 
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In the near term, these dynamics show that judicial review can serve a 
valuable checking function in environmental cases when an administration, such 
as the Trump Administration, has an anti-regulatory outlook that conflicts with 
long-standing congressional mandates written into environmental statutes.223 
As the Senate confirms Trump appointees to the federal courts, however, this 
checking function could weaken, as an increasing number of environmental 
cases are heard by panels comprised of Trump, and other Republican, 
appointees and the number of majority-Democratic panels declines. The extent 
to which Trump Administration policies receive broad judicial deference will 
depend not only on the number of new appointments, but also their distribution 
across the federal circuits. The forty-one successful appointments made as of 
June 24, 2019, to the appellate courts, for example, are relatively evenly 
distributed across the federal circuits, with slightly higher numbers of 
appointments in the Fifth (five), Sixth (six), and Ninth (six) Circuits.224 In many 
cases, the new appointments replace retiring Republican judges in conservative 
circuits, which will limit new appointees’ potential impact on the overall 
balance of Republican and Democratic judges in the federal system.225 To the 
extent that President Trump succeeds in making additional appointments, 
particularly those in more liberal circuits that replace Democratic judges, future 
Democrat administrations would be subject to review more often by Republican 
appointees who would be more likely to overturn executive actions in tension 
with statutes that reflect conservative values. Thus, while judicial ideology has 
the capacity to moderate presidential policies by ensuring that they conform 
with statutory mandates, the process of appointing and confirming federal 
judges influences whether the heightened checks associated with judicial 
ideology favor conservative or liberal statutes. 
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C. Inter-Circuit Difference in Case Outcomes 
The circuit-level effects we observe at the appellate level are also 
conditional—the frequency with which they occur depends on the distribution 
of cases across circuits and the balance of Democratic- and Republican-
appointed judges in each circuit. Litigation under NEPA and the ESA, 
fortuitously, provides a context in which such circuit-level effects are magnified 
by the disproportionate share of cases that were filed in the Ninth Circuit, where 
Democratic appellate judges were in the majority by a margin of 40% to 60% 
during the period covered by our study. The large number of cases improved the 
statistics but, more importantly, it led to the Ninth Circuit accounting for most 
of the majority—and all-Democratic panels nationally. The geographic 
distribution of cases further highlights the contingencies of circuit-level effects 
and the importance of taking into account the circuit structure of the federal 
judiciary and the ideological balance of judges within them. 
The existing literature ignores systemic differences in the ideological 
outlook of Republican and Democratic judges across circuits by focusing either 
on a specific circuit or national trends.226 For example, a Republican judge in 
the Fifth Circuit is likely to be more conservative than a Republican judge in the 
Second Circuit.227 This oversight is particularly surprising given that there are 
structural reasons for such systematic inter-circuit differences in judicial 
ideology. In particular, the tradition of deferring to the senators for the state in 
which a judgeship is held reflects an understanding that the politics and 
ideological perspective of judges should, to some degree, be consistent with 
those of the surrounding state.228 Yet, commentators typically assume that any 
intrusion of a judge’s ideological views represents a threat to the “rule of law” 
and little effort is made to distinguish between inter-judge and inter-circuit 
sources of ideological variance.229 In short, much as there is value in legislative 
experimentation, we believe that there is value in ideologically inflected 
variance in judicial review that is grounded on the structure of the federal 
circuits. Moreover, use of national statistics to assess the influence of judicial 
ideology must take into account that such statistics will reflect both inter-judge 
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and inter-circuit variation in case outcomes between Republican and 
Democratic judges. 
The factors that affect circuit-level statistics on case outcomes are threefold: 
the volume of cases in the circuit, the balance of Republican and Democratic 
judges in the circuit, and any systematic differences in judicial ideology, for 
both Republican and Democratic judges, noted in the preceding paragraph. The 
Ninth Circuit is an outlier with respect to the volume of cases and the ideological 
balance of its appellate judges, which is weighted towards Democratic judges—
and many commentators believe that this liberal bias is systemic as well,230 
which would cut across judges with either political affiliation. The volume of 
cases and ideological balance of judges in a circuit can be amplified by the 
combinatorics of three-judge panels.231 For example, because most circuits have 
very few NEPA appeals and all-Democratic panels are relatively rare (about 
12% of the cases), the Ninth Circuit for statistical reasons alone should account 
for roughly half of the all-Democratic panels. Add to this the skew of the Ninth 
Circuit towards Democratic judges and it is unsurprising that the Ninth Circuit 
accounted for 83% of the appellate panels nationally with exclusively 
Democratic-appointed judges. 
The concentration of cases in the Ninth Circuit both magnified inter-circuit 
differences in the rates at which environmental plaintiffs prevailed and skewed 
the cases towards panels with more liberal judges. In particular, all-Democratic 
panels, as reflected in our data and other studies, favored environmental 
plaintiffs, most likely because each judge’s predilections were reinforced rather 
than tempered by their colleagues.232 In addition, Ninth Circuit judges overall 
may be more liberal than judges in other circuits,233 either because of the 
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while there is evidence that individual judges make decisions on ideological grounds, the 
Ninth Circuit as a whole is not more liberal than other circuits). 
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selection process noted above or because there may be strength in numbers at 
the circuit level that gives judges in the majority greater sway on panels. The 
strong coefficient for the Ninth Circuit in our regressions support this 
inference.234 Further, as the regression results for district court cases bear out 
(plaintiffs were 1.7–2.5 times more likely to prevail at the district court level in 
the Ninth Circuit), one would expect this ideological influence to filter down to 
district court judges through precedent and their attentiveness to being 
overturned on appeal. Moreover, these results cannot be attributed to an 
ideological imbalance among the district judges because, unlike the appellate 
judges, they were evenly split between Democratic and Republican appointees. 
As the Ninth Circuit cases demonstrate, these structural effects are 
magnified when one or a small number of circuits account for a disproportionate 
share of the cases litigated under a statute. Whether this set of conditions skews 
outcomes in a liberal or conservative direction, and how far, will depend on the 
balance of Democratic and Republican appellate judges on the circuit(s). 
Conversely, if cases are distributed relatively uniformly across circuits, perhaps 
due to geographic factors or the absence of forum shopping, circuit-level effects 
will be weak or disappear. These insights also provide new grounds for 
understanding the special status often attributed to the Ninth Circuit. Our 
findings suggest that the Ninth Circuit cannot be reduced to the ideological 
balance of its judges or its size; the strong norm of unanimity and random 
selection of appellate panels are critical mediating factors along with geographic 
and other factors that determine the distribution of cases across federal circuits. 
In combination with the influence of presidential politics, particularly their 
alignment or misalignments with a governing statute, these circuit-level effects 
can enhance or erode the likelihood of judicial review at the appellate level 
checking agency action. While we have described the basic phenomenon, it 
would be useful to model systematically how circuit-level effects are likely to 
vary with the number of circuits in the federal system and their relative size, 
both geographically and with respect to numbers of cases. The importance of 
these factors also exposes the structural contingencies of judicial oversight and 
how they mediate the influence of judicial ideology in administrative cases. In 
doing so, it enhances our understanding of the institutional frameworks and 
political forces that shape the effectiveness of the checks and balances provided 
by an independent judiciary. 
D. Insights into Contemporary Debates About the Structure of Federal 
Courts 
We have identified a mix of institutional and structural factors that, to 
varying degrees, either restrain or magnify the influence of judicial ideology. 
Specifically, the check that judicial review provides on executive branch 
authority depends on the political alignments and misalignments between 
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judges, the statute under review, and the presidential administration in power.235 
Judicial ideology will be a significant factor, and judicial review more likely to 
limit agency action, when presidential politics are at odds with the politics of 
the governing statute and the ideological outlook of the judge(s); its influence 
will be nominal when presidential politics and statutory goals are in alignment. 
These alignments and misalignments, in conjunction with the deferential 
posture of judicial review, constrain the influence of judicial ideology to 
moderating presidential policies towards a centrist interpretation of statutory 
mandates. The same dynamic will cause judicial ideology to have a similar 
moderating effect when agencies exceed rather than fail to meet statutory 
mandates. The impact of this structural counterbalancing dynamic between 
judges, statutory mandates, and presidential administrations can be enhanced, 
as we observe in the Ninth Circuit, or moderated by the distribution of cases 
across circuits and the ideological balance of the judges in them. 
To demonstrate the importance of considering the expanded range of factors 
that we have found to mediate the influence of judicial ideology, we reexamine 
three prominent debates about the structure of the federal judicial system: (1) 
recurrent proposals to split the Ninth Circuit into several smaller circuits; (2) 
statutory provisions creating exclusive jurisdiction of certain cases in a specific 
circuit or a specialized court; and (3) partisan schemes to dramatically expand 
the number of federal judges in order to tip the scales decisively in favor of a 
conservative agenda. These examples are not intended to be exhaustive; instead, 
they illustrate the ways in which a broader understanding of how ideology 
impacts judicial review can inform fundamental questions about the structure of 
the federal judiciary and the process of making judicial appointments. 
1. Anticipating the Consequence of Splitting the Ninth Circuit 
Practitioners236 and politicians237 have developed numerous proposals to 
divide the Ninth Circuit into several smaller circuits. Advocates have argued 
that the court’s docket has become so large that it is preventing its judges from 
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effectively, efficiently, and consistently238 resolving cases.239 Some claim that 
the geographic expanse of the circuit impairs “collegial relations among circuit 
judges [and] undermines their willingness to engage in good faith deliberations 
over case outcomes.”240 In some instances, support for dividing up the Ninth 
Circuit has come from states with smaller populations (and different political 
values) than California, seeking autonomy from the dominance of California 
judges,241 who are often perceived to be too liberal.242 As one commentator has 
aptly expressed it, “the proposed split [of the Ninth Circuit] is a form of 
gerrymandering intended to quarantine the court’s liberal judges in a smaller, 
less powerful circuit.”243 
While the ultimate impact of splitting the Ninth Circuit would depend on 
the details of the proposal, our framework provides general insights into the 
potential tradeoffs. Recall that we identified three central factors that mediate 
the influence of judicial ideology on case results—the volume of cases, the 
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balance of Republican and Democratic judges in a circuit, and the political 
orientation of the judges, liberal or conservative, in the circuit relative to those 
in other circuits.244 All three factors could be affected by such a division. 
Assume, for example, that the Ninth Circuit was divided into one circuit 
consisting of the coastal states and a second circuit consisting of the inland states 
along with Alaska, and that the existing judges were simply distributed 
according to the location of their chambers. If this proposal were instituted 
today, the balance of Republican and Democratic judges in each circuit would 
differ substantially. For example, at the appellate level, 61% of the judges on 
the coastal circuit would be Democratic versus 70% on the inland circuit.245 In 
this context, about two-thirds of NEPA cases in the Ninth Circuit would be filed 
in the coastal circuit if the patterns of NEPA litigation remained stable over 
time. The new circuit structure would consequently result in NEPA cases being 
heard by more Republican judges and fewer all-Democratic panels than if the 
Ninth Circuit were retained in its current form. Moreover, because the number 
of all-Democratic panels scales nonlinearly with the volume of cases,246 the 
impact would be greater on the all-Democratic panels, which would constitute 
21% of the panels in the coastal circuit versus 34% in the inland circuit. 
Although we cannot know without additional information whether the 
politics of the average judge in the two new circuits would differ substantially, 
they could either reinforce or counteract the other effects. For example, if the 
Senators from the affected states influenced the selection of nominees to ensure 
that their views were congruent with state politics, one would expect the judges 
in the coastal states to be more liberal, on average, than those in the inland 
states.247 Under this scenario, the circuit-wide political bias would counteract 
the effect from the higher proportion of Democratic judges in the inland circuit 
and thus diminish the rightward shift in case outcomes associated with such a 
division of the Ninth Circuit. This example illustrates how the existing 
ideological balance of judges can, in effect, be reinforced or moderated 
depending on the volume and geographical distribution of cases across circuits. 
The fuller picture that emerges highlights the nonlinear nature of these 
feedbacks and the complex ways in which the circuit structure of the federal 
system mediates the impact of judicial ideology. 
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2. The Tradeoffs of General Versus Limited Appellate Court 
Jurisdiction 
Appellate court jurisdiction is rarely limited to specific circuits. The most 
notable—and still hotly debated—exception is the Federal Circuit, which 
essentially has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals involving patent disputes.248 
In the field of environmental law, several statutes contain provisions limiting 
the jurisdiction over certain types of claims to a specific court. In the case of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA), all challenges to national regulations must be filed in the 
D.C. Circuit.249 However, little consistency exists across statutes, as illustrated 
by the Clean Water Act (CWA), which lacks an analogous provision despite its 
abundance of national implementing regulations.250 Typically, jurisdictional 
restrictions, along with specialized courts, are created to manage the technical 
complexity of the subject cases,251 to mitigate problems with doctrinal 
uniformity and consistency (including those associated with forum 
shopping),252 or to enhance the efficiency of judicial proceedings.253 To our 
knowledge, the existing literature has not considered how such jurisdictional 
limits affect the politics of judicial review or the judicial appointments process. 
The closest commentary involves concerns about doctrinal rigidity, a common 
critique of the Federal Circuit, but it focuses on particular judges and the 
insularity associated with jurisdictional limits rather than broader structural 
considerations.254 
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Viewed through the lens of our framework, it is immediately apparent that 
centralizing cases in a specific court carries a significant risk that it will elevate 
the importance of judicial ideology. As we have shown, the influence of judicial 
ideology is mediated by the volume of cases and ideological balance of judges 
in a circuit—it rises when cases are concentrated in a circuit and with greater 
imbalances in the ideological outlook of the judges.255 In our data, we observed 
these effects in the Ninth Circuit, which was dominated by Democratic judges 
and accounted for a disproportionate share of the cases heard nationally. 
Jurisdictional limits go further because they concentrate cases in a single court 
and, in doing so, eliminate the averaging across circuits with different mixes of 
judges. The absence of jurisdictional restrictions also makes it much harder for 
politicians to influence case outcomes through the judicial appointments 
process—the ideological balance would have to be shifted on multiple circuits, 
as opposed to just one. 
Limiting challenges to national regulations under the CAA to the D.C. 
Circuit provides a concrete illustration of the tradeoffs and how they can vary. 
In the spectrum of issues that range from the purely local to the national, the 
CAA regulations are explicitly national in scope.256 This simplifies the analysis 
because it effectively neutralizes concerns about federal courts fairly reflecting 
local values. In this light, the case for centralization appears to lack any 
countervailing considerations—except that it overlooks the ways in which 
circuit structure mediates the balance of Republican and Democratic judges that 
hear the cases. Restricting jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit reduces the range of 
judges hearing the cases and, much like the Supreme Court, elevates the 
significance of individual judicial appointments—both because each 
appointment carries greater weight and because controlling the ideological 
balance on a single court is easier. Further, appellate courts, unlike the Supreme 
Court, hear cases as three-judge panels and, as we have seen, the frequency of 
ideologically uniform panels increases nonlinearly as the proportion of 
Republican or Democratic judges rises above 50%.257 As a consequence, 
concentrating cases in a single circuit increases the likelihood that the checks 
provided by judicial review will occur disproportionately from a single political 
camp, or that the dominant ideological perspective will shift from one side to 
the other with the political party that has control over judicial appointments. The 
volume of cases and number of judges will determine the frequency of the 
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resulting doctrinal changes, moderated by precedent, and the impact on a central 
rationale for jurisdictional restrictions—doctrinal uniformity. Limiting 
jurisdiction in this manner circumvents the decentralization of the federal court 
system that operates as a buffer to political forces. While the increased 
efficiency and efficacy may be worth the loss, the increased exposure to 
congressional politics and escalating battles over judicial appointments should 
also be factored into such jurisdictional decisions. 
3. Misconceptions About Ideologically Driven Court Packing 
If the two preceding examples highlight the nuances and pitfalls of circuit 
structure, recent calls to pack federal courts with conservative judges illustrate 
its resilience to such baldly partisan schemes. As noted above, a massive 
expansion of the federal judiciary was recently proposed, in all seriousness, by 
Steven Calabresi.258 Some commentators have associated such proposals, not 
unreasonably, with Franklin Roosevelt’s ill-fated court-packing plan of 1937.259 
One skeptical observer has noted that “it is not unfair to conclude that court-
packing is a major objective of [such a] proposal, even if it is not the only 
one.”260 This begs the question of whether, and under what conditions, a court-
packing plan could succeed or, to put it in the terms explored in this Article, 
whether it would upend the mediating effects that the circuit structure of the 
federal courts and mechanics of judicial decision making have on judicial 
ideology. 
                                                                                                                     
 258 See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 259 See, e.g., Jeff Shesol, Would Trump Consider a Court-Packing Scheme?, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/would-trump-
consider-a-court-packing-scheme [https://perma.cc/M4GG-GXD8] (“[Steven] Calabresi’s 
proposal owes a great, if unacknowledged, debt to Franklin Roosevelt’s failed attempt to 
increase the size of the Supreme Court from nine Justices to fifteen . . . .”); Ilya Somin, The 
Case Against Court-Packing, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/27/the-case-against-court-packing/?ut 
m_term=.4e668627074b [https://perma.cc/Y5WK-5MKB]. Republican legislators have 
introduced legislation to increase the size of the federal judiciary. See generally Judiciary 
ROOM Act of 2018, H.R. 6755, 115th Cong. (bill introduced by Rep. Darryl Issa that would 
add fifty-two new district court judgeships). Democratic politicians have also suggested 
expanding the number of federal judges, but their efforts have focused on the Supreme Court. 
See Cara Bayles, Is the High Court Due for a Revamp? Dems Say Yes, LAW360 (June 25, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/environmental/articles/1171768/is-the-high-court-due-
for-a-revamp-dems-say-yes?nl_pk=6823ade7-090a-4d45-b28e-d8fdd4699435&utm_ 
source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=environmental  [on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal]; Jordan Fabian, Trump Dismisses Court Packing: ‘It Will Never 
Happen,’ HILL (Mar. 19, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/434761-
trump-dismisses-court-packing-it-will-never-happen [https://perma.cc/4BB3-SU9Y]. 
 260 Somin, supra note 259; see also Shesol, supra note 259 (asserting that the Calabresi 
plan reflects conservatives’ view that the institutions of government are “territory to be 
seized and held by whatever means”). 
232 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2 
Even though the Calabresi plan appears farfetched insofar as it calls for at 
least a 36% increase in the number of federal judges,261 it nevertheless appears 
to be calibrated, knowingly or not, to overcome the inherent inertia of the 
appointments process. Although the Trump Administration has succeeded in 
accelerating the appointments process, these efforts have resulted, at the time of 
this writing, in the appointment of forty-one circuit court judges.262 This is 
undoubtedly a significant number of judgeships, but they are spread over 
thirteen circuits. At least for now, about 40% of the appointments affected the 
balance of Republican and Democratic judges on a circuit, as the departing 
judges in 60% of the cases were Republican appointees.263 One of the central 
reasons for this pattern is that judges can delay their retirement until the party 
with which they are affiliated is in power, a dynamic that may be particularly 
true now given the polarizing politics of the Trump Administration. This leaves, 
as Calabresi apparently recognizes, a major expansion of judgeships as the only 
viable option for decisively shifting the ideological orientation of federal judges. 
The breaks on the impact of judicial ideology may weaken if Trump 
appointments reverse the balance of a significant number of circuits.264 
Yet, even if the Republicans succeeded with a plan like Calabresi’s, the 
random appointment of three-judge panels would provide some ballast. For 
example, if Republican judges occupied 80% of the appellate judgeships, 50% 
of the panels would still have at least one Democratic judge, assuming that the 
balance of Republican and Democratic judges was consistent across circuits.265 
If, however, Republicans focused on specific circuits, the dominance of 
Republican judges could be much greater, with essentially no all-Democratic 
panels and few majority-Democratic panels hearing cases in most circuits. 
Further, plaintiffs would likely be far more selective in where they filed cases, 
which could exacerbate the inter-circuit differences we already observe in the 
implementation and interpretation of statutes under NEPA and the ESA. It is 
also important to recognize the limits of judicial review noted above, namely, 
that Democratic administrations would be largely immune to judicial review to 
the extent they operated within the clear bounds of their statutory authority.266 
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More importantly, given that most cases involve challenges premised on 
inadequate agency action, the impact of stacking the courts would be 
asymmetric—it would be most effective in protecting Republican 
administrations against claims that they were falling short of statutory mandates. 
As these numbers illustrate, the transformation required goes far beyond 
anything ever contemplated, including Roosevelt’s infamous court-packing 
plan. However, the structural sources of resilience in the judicial system on 
closer analysis demonstrate that more modest efforts are unlikely to have a 
sizeable impact because judges have control over the timing of their retirements 
and this naturally spreads judicial openings across administrations, and 
geographically over circuits, in ways that allow relatively modest shifts in the 
balance of Republican and Democratic judges. The system is not beyond 
breaking, as demonstrated by the heightened sensitivity of ideologically uniform 
panels to the volume of cases and ideological balance of judges, but the large 
scale of the federal courts and their circuit structure are powerful mediating 
elements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The political controversies surrounding judicial review and appointments of 
federal judges overstate the influence of ideology in judicial opinions and 
presume that it is bad per se. The empirical study presented above shows that 
the influence of judicial ideology is of secondary importance in most cases and 
that when it is a significant factor in case outcomes, judicial ideology typically 
moderates executive branch policies towards centrist positions consistent with 
statutory mandates. We propose a novel framework that explains these 
dynamics and the contingencies that can enhance them as well as the conditions 
under which the limited but positive influence of judicial ideology can be 
seriously compromised. 
                                                                                                                     
authority for the challenged decisions. As noted above, NEPA and the ESA differ in that 
judicial decisions under NEPA can uphold agency actions that give short shrift to NEPA 
procedures but cannot force agencies (under a Democratic administration) to curtail their 
NEPA responsibilities. See supra note 221. Judicial review of agency decisions under the 
ESA can narrow the scope of agency authority to take protective actions as well as forcing 
more aggressive regulatory action. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
